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SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS AS PRECEDENT

RICHARD C. CHEN*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s practice of summarily reversing decisions
based on certiorari filings, without the benefit of merits briefing or
oral argument, has recently come under increasing scrutiny. The
practice is difficult to square with the Court’s stated criteria for
granting certiorari and its norms against reviewing fact-bound cases
to engage in mere error correction. Nonetheless, there is growing
acceptance that the practice is likely to continue in some form, and
the conversation has shifted to asking when the use of summary
dispositions should be considered proper. Commentators have had
no trouble identifying the Court’s tendencies: summary dispositions
are most commonly used to rebuke the lower courts for attempting to
resist Supreme Court doctrine, particularly in federal habeas and
qualified immunity cases. But the Court’s failure to actually adopt
this rationale creates legitimacy and rule-of-law concerns. Furthermore, it is unclear whether such rebuke is likely to be effective in
achieving the Court’s apparent goal of harmonization.
This Article proposes a novel, more constructive approach to
summary dispositions that takes advantage of their unique attributes: they can be put to good use filling in the contours of general
legal standards. It is well understood that standards acquire
meaning only by application to a series of cases, but the Court does
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Hawai‘i at Mœnoa. For helpful conversations and suggestions, I am grateful to Marco Basile,
William Baude, Hajin Kim, Kaipo Matsumura, Celestine McConville, John Rappaport,
Richard Re, Alex Sarch, Judge Paul Watford, Esther Yoo, and Mel Zarr, as well as to
participants in the Fourth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop at Stanford Law School, the
Second Annual Junior Scholars Works-in-Progress Conference at Chapman University School
of Law, and a faculty workshop at the University of Maine School of Law.
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not have space on its plenary docket to take multiple cases in the
same area to perform that function. Summary dispositions, including both affirmances and reversals, provide a mechanism for doing
so in an efficient manner. This proposal is consistent with the
standard criteria for granting certiorari, because the purpose would
not be to correct the error in an individual case, but rather to provide
more broadly useful precedential guidance about the meaning of the
standard at issue. After describing this new purpose, the Article
shows how existing practices should be revised to fulfill it more
effectively. In particular, it develops a set of principled criteria for
selecting cases to resolve by summary disposition, and calls for a
more balanced approach that may be more effective in harmonizing
lower-court decisions than the Court’s current emphasis on rebuking
resistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Supreme Court summarily vacated a lower-court
decision that granted qualified immunity to a police officer sued for
excessive force. The case, Tolan v. Cotton, was noteworthy because
the Court had last ruled against a police officer’s qualified immunity
defense over a decade earlier.1 Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia,
concurred in the judgment. While generally agreeing with the
majority’s analysis on the merits, Alito expressed concern that the
Court’s standards for granting certiorari were being distorted—this
was an “utterly routine” case in which the lower court “invoked the
correct standard.”2 Granting certiorari to fix the misapplication of
that standard ran counter to the Court’s established norms against
reviewing fact-bound cases to engage in mere error correction.3
Commentators were quick to point out the apparent hypocrisy of
Justices Scalia and Alito in taking this position.4 They had not
spoken up, after all, about summary reversals in which the Court
had engaged in mere error correction to the benefit of defendant
officers. Indeed, summary reversals have been far more commonly
used to reach results the conservative Justices generally support,
favoring government officials in qualified immunity cases and the
state in federal habeas cases.5 Two years before Tolan, the same two
Justices had complained because the Court denied certiorari in a
habeas case in which the state had lost and that they themselves
described as fact bound.6 For its part, the Tolan majority acknowledged that the Court cannot “correct every perceived error coming

1. 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (per curiam); William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s
Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 23 & n.72 (2015).
2. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1869 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
3. Id. at 1868.
4. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1241-42 (2015).
5. See Baude, supra note 1, at 39; Edward A. Hartnett, Summary Reversals in the
Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 591, 597-99 (2016).
6. See Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138, 1147 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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from the lower federal courts,”7 but justified its decision to do so in
this case “because the opinion below reflects a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of our precedents.”8
The debate among the Justices in Tolan and other recent cases9
demonstrates that a more principled approach to summary dispositions is needed. Justice Alito was correct to say that the Court’s own
rules and norms disfavor granting review to correct errors in factbound cases. The liberal Justices have cited the same rules in
criticizing summary reversals that favored the state in habeas
cases.10 The Tolan majority’s explanation matches what has become
the standard account, that summary reversals are reserved for
“clearly erroneous” decisions.11 But even if that is a necessary
condition, it can hardly be a sufficient one, as many other cases
could be similarly characterized but would not be deemed important
enough for the Court’s attention.
Summary reversals and other types of summary dispositions are
not a new phenomenon. Around the mid-twentieth century,
commentators took note of the Court’s “increasingly frequent
practice” of granting certiorari and immediately reversing the
decision below in a short, per curiam opinion without receiving
further briefing or allowing for oral argument.12 Critics charged that
this short-circuited process was prone to error, unfair to litigants,
and ultimately inefficient because it would require attorneys to

7. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868 (quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 366 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
8. Id.
9. Most recently, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, squared off against
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, in a debate over the Court’s asymmetrical summary
reversal practices. Justice Sotomayor wrote, “We have not hesitated to summarily reverse
courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity in cases involving the
use of force. But we rarely intervene where courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of
qualified immunity in these same cases.” Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277,
1282-83 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).
Justice Alito defended the Court’s practices as “neutral,” explaining that fact-bound cases are
rarely reviewed but that summary reversals may be appropriate “if the lower court
conspicuously failed to apply a governing legal rule.” Id. at 1278 (Alito, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).
10. See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 11 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 352 (10th ed. 2013).
12. Ernest J. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term—Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 77, 77 (1958).
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always address the merits of cases in their certiorari papers instead
of focusing on the standard criteria of “certworthiness.”13
The Court’s more recent practice remains vulnerable to these
criticisms, but the focus of the conversation has shifted. There is
growing acceptance that summary reversals are a part of what the
Court does, and criticisms now emphasize the lack of stated criteria
for when the Court will use this tool.14 When the Court departs in
an ad hoc manner from its established practices, it opens itself up
to criticism on rule-of-law and legitimacy grounds because it has
placed no constraint on its future practices.15 Those concerns are
exacerbated because the Court’s selective usage is not random, but
reflects a targeting of certain types of cases. That gives rise to the
“cynical interpretation” that the Court is correcting the errors it
dislikes and ignoring the ones it does not mind, thereby carrying out
a substantive agenda that should be more openly acknowledged and
subjected to debate.16
Although the Court itself has not adopted any consistent justification apart from the presence of clear error, commentators generally
agree that summary reversals are most commonly used to rebuke
lower courts for having resisted the Court’s precedents, and in
particular when those courts improperly grant federal habeas or
deny qualified immunity.17 Until the Court actually adopts this
rationale, however, the rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns will
remain. Furthermore, it is not clear that the approach of rebuking
lower courts is likely to be effective in achieving the Court’s
apparent goals. Some judges who have strong views about the law
in these areas will not be deterred by the threat of summary
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See Baude, supra note 1, at 20-22, 38.
15. See infra Part II.A. As Baude notes, “procedural regularity begets substantive
legitimacy.... A sense that [the Court’s] processes are consistent and transparent makes it
easier to accept the results of those processes, win or lose.” Baude, supra note 1, at 10.
16. Baude, supra note 1, at 39. Elsewhere, Baude elaborates on this possible explanation:
“Alito and Scalia think there are different costs to the different kinds of errors. Put crudely,
they like police officers and don’t like prisoners, so they care more about correcting windfalls
for prisoners than for the police.” Will Baude, Tolan v. Cotton—When Should the Supreme
Court Interfere in ‘Factbound’ Cases?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2014, 9:40
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 2014/05/07/tolan-v-cottonwhen-should-the-supreme-court-interfere-in-factbound-cases [https://perma.cc/5QJ9-65AC].
17. See infra Part II.A.
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reversal, while other judges may be overdeterred and go further
than the Court itself would have.18 The result will be deeper
inconsistency and dysfunction rather than the harmony the Court
seeks.
This Article proposes a novel, more constructive justification and
a set of principled criteria for the use of summary dispositions. It is
not an effort to justify existing practice, although some past
instances would be considered proper under the proposed criteria.
Rather, the justification is based on the nature of summary
dispositions and how they could be put to effective use. Further, the
logic of the proposal suggests that it should not be limited to
reversals: summary affirmances have the same potential to serve a
useful purpose.
My proposal is that summary dispositions be used to help fill in
the contours of general legal standards. It is well understood that
standards, as opposed to rules, acquire meaning through their
application to a series of cases.19 That is certainly true with respect
to the reasonableness inquiries contained in the habeas and
qualified immunity standards. Such standards are ubiquitous, and
necessarily so, in every area of the law.20 But the Court does not
have room on its plenary docket to take multiple cases on a given
issue to provide the necessary calibration. Summary dispositions
provide a mechanism for doing so in a more resource-efficient
manner. Thus, summary dispositions need not be seen as a
problematic practice to be reined in; rather, they can be harnessed
to play a constructive role in the development of the law.
A brief example will help to illustrate the proposal. In Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court revised the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to require
plaintiffs to offer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”21 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Court elaborated on this new plausibility standard, articulating

18. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 597, 605-06.
19. See Paul J. Watford, Richard C. Chen & Marco Basile, Crafting Precedent, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 543, 569 (2017) (reviewing BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
(2016)).
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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more clearly a two-step analysis.22 First, courts should identify and
set aside legal conclusions that are not entitled to be presumed true,
and second, they should assess whether the properly pled factual
allegations plausibly state an entitlement to relief.23 Together, the
two cases established a new doctrinal framework for assessing the
adequacy of a complaint.
But much uncertainty about this doctrinal test remains because
“we still lack a concrete understanding of what [it] means in
practical terms.”24 In particular, the Court’s only guidance on the
concept of plausibility is that it falls somewhere on the spectrum
between possibility and probability.25 Of course, as a general legal
standard, the term cannot be defined much more precisely in the
abstract. Thus, commentators immediately predicted that the new
regime would lead to confusion and inconsistency,26 and indeed
there are significant areas of divergence in the lower courts.27 I
suggest that this is an area of law in which the Court could use
summary dispositions to offer meaningful guidance. The Court has
not reviewed a pleading case since Iqbal,28 perhaps thinking it has
settled the major questions of principle and not wanting to expend
22. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
23. Id.
24. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12
(2009).
25. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. There is also considerable uncertainty about the first step,
namely how to identify allegations that are too conclusory. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 841 (2010).
26. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 24, at 10-11.
27. One level of disagreement concerns to what extent Twombly and Iqbal actually
changed the standard. Because the Court itself gave conflicting signals, lower courts were
unsure of how much higher a bar plausibility was intended to impose. See id. at 7-8; see also
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117,
2128 (2015) (citing examples of confusion). Another level of disagreement concerns how much
the bar may shift depending on the nature of the claims at issue. Although it is clear that the
new standard applies to all substantive areas, some courts apply it more flexibly than others,
requiring more or less factual detail depending on the complexity of the cases. See Nicholas
Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 523-25
(2009). Still other inconsistencies exist. See, e.g., Colleen McNamara, Note, Iqbal as Judicial
Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 401, 417 (2011) (distinguishing between what the author calls the “checklist
approach” and the “common sense gloss” used by lower courts).
28. The Court performed a brief plausibility analysis in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1863-64 (2017), a case that was primarily about the availability of a Bivens remedy.
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the substantial resources that plenary review would require.29 But
by addressing a few cases summarily across a variety of substantive
domains, the Court could help flesh out the contours of the plausibility standard and enable lower courts to apply it in a more consistent
manner.
Using summary dispositions for the purpose proposed here avoids
one of the main critiques of the practice, namely that it is prone to
error. The risk of error is reduced because the Court would not be
using summary dispositions to resolve novel legal issues. Rather,
their use would be limited to cases in which the relevant doctrinal
test—such as the plausibility pleading standard—has previously
been established, but additional illustrations are needed to provide
guidance on how that test actually operates. And because resolving
such cases depends primarily on the exercise of calibration and
judgment, rather than any complex legal analysis, the Court should
feel relatively comfortable using summary procedures.30
Moreover, the proposed justification would be consistent with the
standard criteria for granting certiorari, because the purpose would
not be to correct the error in an individual case, but rather to
provide more broadly useful precedential guidance about the meaning of the standard at issue. Relatedly, the proposed approach
provides an answer to a long-standing puzzle about summary
dispositions. Early critics of the practice flagged the incongruity of
saying that a case is important enough to warrant the exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction, but not important enough to require
“more than summary consideration.”31 The answer suggested here
is that a case can be important but not complex.32 A case taken up
29. David Noll identifies several outstanding questions that remain after Iqbal, such as
whether a district court may allow discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending. See David
L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 141 (2010). At least some of the
questions he identifies would warrant plenary review because they would involve more than
merely offering additional illustrations of the plausibility analysis.
30. As described below, there have been repeated calls for the Court to at least offer
parties a chance to file supplemental briefs on the merits before issuing a summary reversal.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-68. As discussed in Part IV.B, I agree that such a reform
would provide a valuable safeguard against error and would not negate the efficiency gains
to be realized from using summary procedures.
31. See Brown, supra note 12, at 94.
32. As explained in Part III.A below, I do not mean to suggest that such cases are easy,
only that courts can make the required judgment calls about the application of law to fact
without the full adversarial process.
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to illustrate the operation of a general legal standard will typically
be a straightforward one, and its significance as an individual
precedent may be relatively minor.33 But considered alongside other
summary dispositions addressing the same issue, the cases in the
aggregate play an important role in developing the law around the
standard in question.34
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides further background on summary dispositions, from their origins up through
current usage in the Roberts Court. Part II explains existing
practice and critiques it on two grounds. First, after acknowledging
that a desire to rebuke lower courts appears to explain current
usage, I argue that the Court’s failure to expressly adopt criteria
still gives rise to rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns. Second, even
assuming the Court adopted the prevailing explanation as a governing rationale, I argue that the approach of rebuke is unlikely to be
effective in harmonizing lower-court decisions in the areas the Court
deems problematic.
Part III lays out the novel justification that summary dispositions
be used to help calibrate the meaning of general legal standards.
Part IV addresses how the Court’s practices should be revised to
serve that function most effectively. I explain why summary affirmances, as well as reversals, can fulfill that purpose and develop
a set of principled criteria for when intervention by summary
disposition is appropriate. Furthermore, I argue that a more balanced approach than the Court currently uses would not only
advance my proposed justification, but also more effectively promote
the harmonization the Court seeks.
I. SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS PAST AND PRESENT
A. Historical Practices and Perspectives
The Supreme Court’s use of summary dispositions goes back to
the late nineteenth century.35 These dispositions took the form of
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 708
(1956).
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short, per curiam decisions, sometimes offering only a single
sentence stating the result and not always providing even a citation
to authority.36 Cases were summarily affirmed or reversed when
they presented issues falling squarely within existing Supreme
Court precedent.37 The Court also summarily dismissed appeals
from state court decisions for lack of a substantial federal question,
on the ground that the purported federal issue was so “clearly
foreclosed ... that there cease[d] to be a true federal question except
in form.”38
From 1891, when Congress created the writ of certiorari, to 1988,
when Congress eliminated most forms of mandatory jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court’s mandatory docket was substantial.39 That fact
suggests that summary dispositions may have been necessary to
manage the Court’s workload. But the Court’s reliance on summary
dispositions was not limited to its mandatory docket.40 Beginning
around the 1950s, the Court engaged in the “increasingly frequent
practice of granting certiorari and simultaneously reversing the
decision of a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court
without briefs or arguments upon the merits.”41
Scholars first took note of the practice of summary dispositions
around this same time.42 They were most critical of those dispositions that provided no reasoning at all.43 One line of criticism
focused on the importance of reasoning from the standpoint of the
rule of law. For example, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington
described a trend in which the Court merely announced “results
accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason,” relying
36. See id. at 707.
37. See id. at 708.
38. Id. at 708-09. Of course, dismissals for lack of a substantial federal question and
summary affirmances achieve the same result and may take the same shortened form.
Commentators seeking to explain why the Court preferred the former for appeals from state
courts and the latter for appeals from federal district courts suggested that “the Court may
be reluctant to dismiss appeals from federal district courts because doubt might be cast on the
jurisdiction of the district court and hence on the Court’s own jurisdiction to hear the merits
of the appeal.” Id. at 713.
39. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 11, at 75-76.
40. Note, supra note 35, at 708.
41. Brown, supra note 12, at 77.
42. Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term—Foreward, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 99
(1954); see Note, supra note 35, at 707.
43. Note, supra note 35, at 707, 723.
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on “per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge
between the authorities they cite and the results they decree.”44
After quoting an example of one such case, the authors concluded
that the “decision does not attempt to gain reasoned acceptance for
the result, and thus does not make law in the sense which the term
‘law’ must have in a democratic society.”45
Summary dispositions with no reasoning also produced confusion,
both for the parties involved and for future litigants and courts
seeking to apply the cases as precedent. The Supreme Court took
the view that its summary dispositions were entitled to precedential
weight.46 When the decision was an affirmance, future readers could
at least look to the opinion below for guidance, even though that
would not reliably indicate the actual grounds for the Court’s
decision.47 Summary reversals with little or no reasoning provided
an even greater challenge because “there is no opinion of a court
below to look to for guidance.”48
Some commentators during this time period acknowledged that
summary dispositions could be appropriate, but questioned the
Court’s willingness to use them in particular instances. As Albert
Sacks explained:
The summary opinion is one of various processes whereby the
Court seeks to assure that time and effort of the Justices are
allocated in relation to the importance and complexity of what
is to be decided. As such, the summary opinion has obvious
utility in the efficient functioning of the Court, and there can be
no question of its propriety. There remains, however, the problem of its appropriate use, and, more specifically, whether the
44. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
45. Id. at 5.
46. See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s
Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 817 (1983); Note, supra note 35, at
713.
47. Sacks, supra note 42, at 102; Note, supra note 35, at 715 (“Although the Illinois court
might well have read more carefully the opinion of the court which was affirmed, reliance on
such opinions is not always prudent because the affirmance does not indicate adoption of the
opinion below.”).
48. Note, supra note 35, at 718. Compounding the difficulty, the Court in such cases would
sometimes cite a precedent with “easily distinguishable” facts or reasoning that did “not seem
readily applicable.” Id. at 715.
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Court is extending the use of the summary opinion to cases
where fuller exposition of views is warranted.49

Sacks went on to detail several such examples.50 Other commentators provided examples of their own, in which the Court used summary dispositions “to extend a prior doctrine, rather than reaffirm
its settled nature,”51 or reversed decisions that could not be considered “clearly erroneous.”52
The practice of issuing dispositions with no reasoning whatsoever
peaked with the Warren Court and receded in the 1970s during the
early years of the Burger Court.53 Since that time, the Supreme
Court has tended to provide at least a couple of pages of reasoning
in decisions that address the merits of cases.54 Thus, the concerns
about the complete absence of reasoning are no longer applicable.
Complaints about the Court’s choice to act summarily still arise,
though they seem to be less frequent.55 However, early critics also
raised a series of objections grounded in the concerns of procedural
regularity, and these remain relevant today.
First is a concern about the quality of the decision-making
process. When the Supreme Court reverses on the basis of the
certiorari papers alone, it does so without the benefit of the full
49. Sacks, supra note 42, at 99.
50. See id. at 100-03.
51. Note, supra note 35, at 709. The author of this piece goes on to describe the example
of two flag salute cases in which the Court summarily rejected challenges on religious liberty
grounds based on a precedent that had “upheld compulsory military training at a state
university” against similar objections. Id. The author concludes that the question could not
have been insubstantial, given “that within three years a full opinion reaffirming the per
curiams was necessary, and indeed the matter was not finally put to rest until further
examination in a full opinion resulted in a reversal of the Court’s former position.” Id. at 710
(footnotes omitted).
52. Brown, supra note 12, at 87.
53. Hellman, supra note 46, at 824.
54. The Court continues to provide more bare-bones statements in particular types of
orders, such as for denials of certiorari, GVRs (grant, vacate, and remand orders), and
jurisdictional dismissals. See, e.g., Piper v. Middaugh, 136 S. Ct. 2408 (2016) (per curiam)
(granting the petition, vacating the judgment, and remanding “for further consideration in
light of Mullenix v. Luna”).
55. See, e.g., Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that summary reversal was not warranted because existing precedent did not
speak clearly to the disputed issue). The more common complaint, as discussed in Part I.B
below, is that the Court is summarily reversing fact-bound cases that do not warrant
discretionary review at all.
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adversarial process.56 Certiorari petitions and opposition briefs are
supposed to be about whether a case warrants discretionary review
and not primarily about the case’s merits.57 Nor is the lower court’s
opinion and accompanying record likely to be an “adequate substitute” for receiving the parties’ own contentions.58 And although it
may turn out, in any given case, that further briefing or oral argument proves unhelpful, the Court typically cannot know whether
that will be true in advance.59
Second is a concern about fairness to the parties. The Court’s
rules both then and now instruct attorneys to give in their certiorari
petitions a “direct and concise argument amplifying the reasons
relied on for the allowance of the writ.”60 The rules both then and
now further indicate that discretionary review will be granted only
for “compelling reasons,” which tend to involve conflicting decisions
among the lower courts and not mere errors of analysis.61 As of
1995, the rules have specifically cautioned that a “petition for a writ
of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.”62 Given these express instructions, the “reasonable
expectation” of parties and their counsel is that they should reserve
arguments on the merits to focus their briefing on “certworthiness,”
but that expectation is defeated when the Court summarily reverses
without providing any further opportunity to weigh in.63
Third is a concern about efficiency, which follows from the second:
if parties understand that the Court will sometimes reverse on the
basis of certiorari papers alone, then they will spend more time in
their petitions and oppositions on the merits of the case. Commentators in the 1950s observed that savvy attorneys were already doing
just that,64 and the leading manual on practice before the Supreme

56. See Brown, supra note 12, at 79-81.
57. See id. at 79.
58. Id. at 80.
59. See id.
60. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(h); SUP. CT. R. 23(1)(h) (1954) (repealed 1967).
61. SUP. CT. R. 10. Earlier versions of the rules refer to “special and important reasons.”
SUP. CT. R. 19(1) (1954).
62. SUP. CT. R. 10 (1995).
63. Brown, supra note 12, at 82.
64. See id. at 81.
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Court makes that suggestion explicitly.65 To the extent that many
or most of the briefs at the certiorari stage are now addressing the
merits of cases, then the practice of summary reversals may create
a net loss for efficiency. Whatever the Court saves in time from
avoiding oral argument in a handful of cases each term, it loses
more by having to review substantially longer briefs across many
more petitions.66
Scholars proposed a simple fix to address all of these concerns.
The Court could “request briefs in cases which might appear at first
examination suitable for disposition without argument, and give
assurance that no case would be decided on the merits without such
request.”67 Adopting such a practice would ensure that parties have
a fair opportunity to address the merits, reduce any need to cram
those arguments into the certiorari papers, and improve the quality
of the Court’s decision-making process. Despite renewed calls for
such a policy, including from within the Court itself,68 no such
change has taken place.
B. Recent Trends
The practice of summary reversals in the Roberts Court has
attracted recent attention.69 The focus here and in most commentary
is on the category of cases engaged in error correction. These are the
cases the Supreme Court reverses because they are simply wrong,
even though they present no novel legal question in need of resolving.70 Put another way, the cases are fact bound. This category of
fact-bound error correction represents the most substantial group

65. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 11, at 357.
66. See Brown, supra note 12, at 82.
67. Id. at 95.
68. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 410 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the
Court contemplates a summary disposition it should, at the very least, invite the parties to
file supplemental briefs on the merits, at their option.” (emphasis omitted)).
69. Even writers in the popular media have taken note. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Mystery
of Citizens United Sequel Is Format, Not Ending, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2012), https://www.ny
times.com/2012/06/12/us/in-citizens-united-ii-how-justices-rule-may-be-an-issue-itself.html
[https://perma.cc/72VM-YA28] (describing the summary reversal as “a favorite tool of the
court led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.” and noting that “[s]uch rulings have been the
subject of criticism from practitioners and the legal academy”).
70. Hellman, supra note 46, at 828.
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of summary reversals, as well as the most controversial usage.71
Outside of this definable subcategory, the Court’s use of summary
reversals is more akin to the exercise of an “ad hoc prerogative.”72
Some statistics about the Court’s practices may provide helpful
context for the discussion to come.73 Consider first how often the
Court uses the tool. From the beginning of Chief Justice Roberts’s
tenure in 2005 through June 2019, the Court summarily reversed
eighty-eight cases.74 That works out to an average of a little over six
cases per term. There is no discernible upward trend, as the
numbers were nine in the first term and four in the last, with a
peak of twelve in 2015.75
71. Id. at 823-24.
72. See Baude, supra note 1, at 35. For example, in Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659
(2014) (per curiam), the Court summarily reversed to correct a problem it had created through
a stray statement in an earlier opinion in the same case. See Baude, supra note 1, at 27-30.
73. I am excluding for present purposes the similar practice of summary orders that
“simultaneously grant certiorari petitions, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case
to the lower court for ‘reconsideration.’” Alex Hemmer, Courts as Managers: American
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 209, 212 (2013). These so-called “grant, vacate, and remand,” or “GVR,” orders
are “most commonly used when the ruling below might be affected by one of the Court’s
recently rendered decisions, which was issued after the lower court ruled.” Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711,
712 (2009). However, like Baude and Hartnett, I count as summary reversals any cases in
which the Court actually corrects some aspect of the lower court’s decision, rather than merely
pointing out some intervening or overlooked precedent, even if the ultimate disposition
involves vacating rather than reversing. See Baude, supra note 1, at 22 n.69; Hartnett, supra
note 5, at 593 n.11.
74. I used as my starting point the seventy-three cases Hartnett identifies through May
2016. See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 619-21. I then counted fifteen additional ones through the
end of June 2019. From the October 2018 term: Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam) (abortion); Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (per
curiam) (state habeas); Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019) (per curiam) (federal habeas); City
of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019) (per curiam) (qualified immunity). From the
October 2017 term: Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018) (per curiam) (qualified immunity);
Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555 (2018) (per curiam) (federal habeas); Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam) (qualified immunity); CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S.
Ct. 761 (2018) (per curiam) (interpretation of collective bargaining agreements); Tharpe v.
Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curiam) (federal habeas); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9
(2017) (per curiam) (federal habeas); Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4 (2017) (per curiam) (federal
habeas). And from the October 2016 term: Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam)
(same-sex marriage rights); Jenkins v. Hutton, 137 S. Ct. 1769 (2017) (per curiam) (federal
habeas); Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726 (2017) (per curiam) (federal habeas); and White
v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam) (qualified immunity).
75. The October 2018 cases are cited in the preceding footnote. The cases for the other two
cited terms can be found in Hartnett, supra note 5, at 619-21.
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Compared to past Courts, the use of summary reversals in the
Roberts Court does not stand out from a quantitative perspective.
Arthur Hellman’s review of the Warren Court’s practices found an
average of about fifteen summary reversals per term, over the
course of sixteen terms.76 These were of the extremely bare variety,
with “no more than a citation or two by way of explanation.”77 As
noted earlier, the Burger Court shifted from the practice of one-line
decisions to providing a couple of pages of reasoning.78 Hellman’s
study showed an average of about twenty-three decisions per term
from the 1971 term through the 1979 term.79 One study of the
Rehnquist Court’s use of per curiam decisions (which presumably
included all summarily decided cases but would not have been
limited to them) found an average of six per term.80
Although the Roberts Court’s practices do not stand out numerically, they have nonetheless attracted attention because of the
Court’s apparent focus on particular areas of law. Of the eightyeight summary reversals from the 2005 to 2018 terms, forty-one
have come in federal habeas cases.81 Qualified immunity is a
somewhat distant second at eleven.82 The Supreme Court has also
summarily reversed multiple cases involving sentencing challenges,
the Federal Arbitration Act, and state habeas law.83
Furthermore, the Court’s interest in reversing federal habeas and
qualified immunity cases is asymmetrical. Of the forty-one federal
habeas cases, thirty-four were reversed in favor of the state; and of
the eleven qualified immunity cases, nine were reversed in favor of
the government official.84 Hartnett finds it “surprising” that the
76. See Hellman, supra note 46, at 822 (counting about 250 decisions over sixteen years).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 825.
79. Id. at 826-27.
80. See Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme
Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 561-62 (2000).
81. Hartnett’s study found thirty-four federal habeas cases. See Hartnett, supra note 5,
at 594-95. As reflected in note 74, supra, seven of the new cases I found involved federal
habeas.
82. Hartnett found seven summary reversals in the qualified immunity category.
Hartnett, supra note 5, at 595. As reflected in note 74, supra, I found four additional such
cases.
83. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 594-95; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012); United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
84. Hartnett’s numbers were twenty-eight and six. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 595. Six of
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habeas petitioners prevailed as often as they did,85 but it is worth
noting that all but one of the cases he identified involved some
defect or oversight in the lower court’s process86 and did not address
the merits of the habeas claim.87 By contrast, in the majority of the
cases in which the state prevailed, the Court reversed on the merits
of the habeas claim, and only a handful involved procedural
defects.88
The two areas of federal habeas and qualified immunity share a
key feature. Review in both areas is supposed to be deferential—to
state courts for habeas and to government officials for qualified
immunity. The federal habeas standard instructs courts not to grant
a habeas petition unless the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
the federal habeas cases cited in note 74, supra, were reversed in favor of the state. Only
Tharpe v. Sellers came out the other way. 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curiam). Three of the four
qualified immunity cases cited in note 74, supra, were reversed in favor of the government
official. Only Sause v. Bauer came out the other way. 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018) (per curiam).
85. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 595.
86. The five cases on Hartnett’s list were as follows: Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891,
894-95 (2015) (per curiam) (holding that the lower courts misapplied the “interests of justice”
standard in denying the habeas petitioner’s request for substitute counsel); Williams v.
Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659, 2659 (2014) (per curiam) (correcting an unintended statement from
an earlier Court opinion in the same case); Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 285 (2010) (per
curiam) (holding that the court of appeals erred by presuming the correctness of the state
court’s factual findings without considering all the “potentially applicable exceptions” to that
rule); Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 2 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that the court of
appeals erred by remanding “with instructions to deny the writ” without giving the district
court the opportunity to consider claims it had previously treated as moot because it granted
relief on other grounds); and Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2005) (per curiam) (holding
that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the habeas petitioner had failed to raise
a claim adequately by looking at the state court opinion and not the brief that had been filed
there). A sixth case came from my set of post-May 2016 summary reversals. In Tharpe, the
Court’s decision was also far removed from the merits, holding only that the circuit court had
denied the habeas petitioner’s certificate of appealability application on an invalid ground.
138 S. Ct. at 546.
87. The one exception was Porter v. McCollum, which I discuss at length in Part IV.C
below. 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam).
88. For the full list of cases Hartnett identifies, see Hartnett, supra note 5, at 595 n.18.
The cases I would describe as involving some procedural error include: Kernan v. Hinojosa,
136 S. Ct. 1603, 1604 (2016) (per curiam) (holding that the California Supreme Court’s
summary denial of a habeas petition was on the merits and therefore warranted deferential
review); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 525 (2012) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding
because the court of appeals failed to address every ground supporting the state court’s
decision); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 7 (2007) (holding that the federal habeas petition was
untimely).

2020]

SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS AS PRECEDENT

709

law.”89 Similarly, government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”90 Thus, in both areas the federal court’s basic task is
to identify clearly established principles from governing precedent
and determine whether they were reasonably applied.
With these similarities in mind, it is easy to see the standard
formula in the Court’s summary reversal decisions. When the lower
court has relied on purportedly analogous precedent, the Court
shows that the cited cases are readily distinguishable and cannot
support the principle that the lower court claimed was clearly
established.91 When the lower court has cited (or is left with) only
general principles, the Court reiterates that such high-level statements will only rarely suffice.92 The Court then concludes that the
state court or defendant official could not be said to have acted
unreasonably under these general principles.93
The patterns are readily discernible, but they provoke a natural
question: Why these cases and not others? As noted in the Introduction, the explanation that the lower-court decisions at issue involved
clear error seems insufficient. Many certiorari petitions every year
presumably identify serious errors in the decisions below. And if
some summary reversals are drawing dissents from one or more
Justices, it seems unlikely that the cases selected for such treatment could have involved the most egregious errors in the pool.94
With the Court itself providing no satisfactory answer, the next
Part turns to explanations from commentators (as well as Justices
writing separately) and a critique of current practice.

89. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
90. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam).
91. See, e.g., id. at 308-09 (qualified immunity example); Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429,
431 (2014) (per curiam) (habeas example).
92. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (qualified immunity
example); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 49 (2012) (per curiam) (habeas example).
93. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552; Parker, 567 U.S. at 47-48.
94. Cf. Ray, supra note 80, at 546 (noting that use of the “per curiam label gives the
opinion an unearned aura of inevitability that may strengthen the majority’s position against
the counterarguments raised by the dissent”).
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II. EXPLAINING AND CRITIQUING CURRENT PRACTICE
This Part begins by explaining why the absence of stated criteria
for the Court’s use of summary reversals undermines the rule of law
and the Court’s legitimacy. The rationale supplied by commentators—that summary reversals are designed to rebuke lower courts
for resisting the Supreme Court’s commands—helps to explain
current practice, but cannot fully address these concerns unless the
Court itself adopts the rationale. Part II.B further contends that,
even setting aside rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns, the practice
of rebuking lower courts for their purported resistance may not be
effective in achieving the Court’s apparent goal of harmonization.
A. The Problem of Agenda Selection
Commentators and dissenting Justices continue to critique the
practice of summary reversals from the standpoints of fairness,
quality of the decision-making process, and efficiency.95 At the same
time, there is a sense of resigned acceptance that the practice will
continue in some form. The leading treatise on Supreme Court
practice, for example, says that “there appears to be agreement that
summary disposition is appropriate to correct clearly erroneous
decisions of lower courts.”96 As William Baude puts it, “[W]holesale
criticism is fading” and “the Court has worked to regularize” the
practice.97 Further, as noted above, the objection to one-line opinions
from the earlier era no longer applies, because the Court now at
least provides “written opinions [sufficient to] ... guide the litigants
and enable the Court’s reasoning to be judged.”98
As the practice of summary reversals has become regularized, a
new line of critique has emerged questioning the basis on which the
Court is choosing to deploy this tool. Baude describes this as an
issue of “agenda selection,” noting that “the Court’s criteria here are

95. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 11, at 354-57 (citing dissenting opinions and providing
the authors’ own views).
96. Id. at 352.
97. Baude, supra note 1, at 20.
98. Id. at 21.
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not explained and may not be fully thought through.”99 Others,
including most recently Alex Hemmer, connect this to a larger
puzzle raised by the selection process: “[H]ow can a case be significant enough to merit the Court’s consideration, but not significant
enough to warrant the benefits of adversarial procedure?”100
The absence of any stated criteria, apart from the presence of
clear error, undermines the rule of law as well as the Court’s
legitimacy. A full discussion of these complex concepts is not
necessary to make a couple of straightforward points. First, a core
concept of the rule of law is that the government’s decision-making
should be constrained by principles stated in advance.101 Second, the
Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy depends at least in part on
the public’s perception that it is making decisions based on
legal—rather than political—grounds.102 By placing no constraint on
its future use of summary reversals, the Court undermines both of
these values.103
99. Id. at 38. In White v. Pauly, the Court offered a brief explanation for why it has taken
a particular interest in qualified immunity cases. 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam).
First, “qualified immunity is important to ‘society as a whole.’” Id. (quoting City & County of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)). Second, “as ‘an immunity from
suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”
Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). These justifications do not
withstand serious scrutiny. As Baude explains, the former point could be made about “nearly
any alleged error in public law,” while the latter point could be made about “every defense
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity
Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 87 (2018). These features of qualified immunity do nothing
to explain why it “deserves a special place on the Supreme Court’s agenda.” Id.
100. Hemmer, supra note 73, at 209 (emphasis omitted). Brown made a similar point
earlier: “[I]f the Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction to deal with issues of national
significance, almost by definition those issues warrant, if they do not require, more than
summary consideration.” Brown, supra note 12, at 94.
101. See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2001) (“At a minimum, therefore, the rule of law
requires fairly generalized rule through law [and] a substantial amount of legal predictability
(through generally applicable, published, and largely prospective laws).”); see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3 (1997) (describing a familiar understanding of the rule of law as requiring that the law’s
meaning “be fixed and publicly known in advance of application, so that those applying the
law, as much as those to whom it is applied, can be bound by it”).
102. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1839-40 (2009).
103. Of course, it has long been understood that purportedly neutral criteria do not entirely
remove discretion or obviate the need for value judgments. See Kent Greenawalt, The
Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 991-92 (1978). But few
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Not only has the Court failed to identify such constraints, but its
use of summary reversals for error-correction purposes directly
contradicts its stated criteria for granting discretionary review. As
noted earlier, the Court’s own rules indicate that “compelling
reasons” are required and the need to correct error will rarely
suffice.104 Given that the rule contemplates exceptions, the Court’s
occasional intervention for truly unusual circumstances would not
be as objectionable. But the lack of an express justification is more
troubling because the Court does in fact regularly intervene in
unremarkable cases, and its interventions are not random, but
follow a clear pattern.
Without coming out and saying what it is doing, the Court has
targeted federal habeas and qualified immunity cases for special
attention, and it intervenes in a one-sided manner.105 This unexplained focus gives rise to the “cynical interpretation” that a
majority of Justices care enough to intervene only when the lower
court incorrectly rules against the state or government official, but
not when it incorrectly rules the other way.106 Such a selective use
of error correction exacerbates concerns about the rule of law and
legitimacy, suggesting that the Court is manipulating certiorari
procedures to carry out a veiled substantive agenda that should be
openly acknowledged and subjected to debate.107
Commentators and individual Justices writing separately have
filled the gap with a rationale that seems adequate to explain
current practice. The most common reason for summary reversals
appears to be a desire to rebuke the lower courts. This occurs in
areas in which the Supreme Court has perceived “resistance”108 or
would disagree that some effort to base decisions on principle is desirable. See id. at 1001
(acknowledging disagreement over “how attainable [neutral] principles are and whether they
should give way to other ends of judicial decision,” but suggesting that no “critic denies that
at least one thing for which courts should strive is principled justification”).
104. SUP. CT. R. 10. The rules also contemplate the possibility of summary disposition,
though again without any criteria to govern its use. See SUP. CT. R. 16.1.
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106. Baude, supra note 1, at 39.
107. Id.; see also Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Process, 123 YALE L.J. F. 551, 562 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayorand-the-supreme-courts-certiorari-process [https://perma.cc/S8AD-B382] (describing “the current Court’s disdain for error correction [as] selective” and noting its willingness to
“summarily revers[e] decisions favorable to criminal defendants and habeas petitioners”).
108. Hartnett, supra note 5, at 597.
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“rebellion”109 by the lower courts. Federal habeas and qualified
immunity constitute the largest groups of cases of that type, but
similar concerns may underlie the Court’s summary reversals in
arbitration and sentencing cases.110 Taking on a substantial number
of these cases, even if only to correct errors, is considered important
to reinforcing the Court’s supremacy.111 Moreover, because the goal
in such cases is to send a message of disapproval, the lack of full
plenary consideration actually strengthens that message by
implying that the correct result was obvious.112
The Court’s language in some of its summary reversals supports
this explanation. For example, it has expressed frustration that
lower courts repeatedly fail to apply a sufficiently deferential
standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),113 and that they need continual reminders “not to define
clearly established law at a high level of generality” in qualified
immunity cases.114 In one instance, the Court opened its opinion by
describing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to set aside two murder
convictions as “based on the flimsiest of rationales.”115 In another,
after summarizing and quoting from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,
the Supreme Court declared in a one-word sentence, “No.”116
Similarly, dissenting Justices have referred to summary reversals
as a “bitter medicine”117 needed only when the lower court has
attempted “to defy”118 precedent in explaining why a particular case
did not warrant such treatment. Justices Scalia and Alito have been
the most explicit in laying out their rationales when voting to
summarily reverse. Summary reversal was not appropriate merely
109. Baude, supra note 1, at 39.
110. See id. at 31-32.
111. See id.
112. See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 613 (“[S]ummary reversal sends a corrective message,
particularly in the face of resistance, that reversal after plenary consideration does not.”).
113. See, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 460 (2015) (per curiam) (“This Court, time
and again, has instructed that AEDPA ... ‘erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief
for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.’” (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571
U.S. 12, 19 (2013))).
114. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
115. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 38 (2012) (per curiam).
116. Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (per curiam).
117. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 268 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
118. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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to correct the error in a qualified immunity case that the defendant
officer won below.119 But the Court may need “to perform the unaccustomed task of reviewing utterly fact-bound decisions that
present no disputed issues of law” to prevent “federal judges [who]
like to second-guess state courts” from evading “Congress’s abridgment of their habeas power.”120 Baude summarizes the apparent
theory as follows:
Their idea seems to be that summary reversals are warranted
in areas of law where there is an unusual epidemic of lowercourt judges willfully refusing to apply the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the law. And implicit in their votes is an
assertion—true, or not—that there is an epidemic of pro-habeas
willfulness in habeas cases, but not of pro-officer willfulness in
civil rights suits.121

Hemmer provides a theoretical grounding for the practice,
arguing that it is not merely an expression of frustration, but rather
an exercise of the Court’s “managerial” authority.122 Summary
reversals allow the Court to “send signals about its commitments
and priorities, even on settled areas of law, by illustrating particularly egregious misapplications.”123 He considers summary reversals
alongside so-called GVRs (grant, vacate, and remand orders), which
enable the Court to “ensure that more lower-court decisions take
account of intervening precedent without the Court spending its
own time and energy on cases that pose similar issues.”124 Together,
these tools show the Court “acting in its managerial capacity—rather than its lawmaking or its error-correcting capacity—to
119. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868-69 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Alito was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 1868.
120. Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138, 1147 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Alito. Id. at 1141.
121. Baude, supra note 1, at 27.
122. Hemmer, supra note 73, at 210.
123. Id. at 213. Richard Re has written more generally about the Supreme Court’s use of
nonprecedential signals, in which the Justices may “indicate some aspect of how lower courts
should decide cases” through “summary orders, statements during oral argument, separate
opinions, and dicta in majority opinions.” Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent
from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 942 (2016). He identifies pros (“promot[ing] efficiency and
uniformity”) and cons (“the challenge of reliably identifying signals”) to the Court’s use of
signals and lower courts’ reliance on them. Id. at 944.
124. Hemmer, supra note 73, at 213.
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dispose of more cases with less effort, to correct egregious legal
errors when they arise, and to preserve the Court’s limited resources for cases that present novel legal problems.”125
As the above summary indicates, observations from scholars and
the Justices themselves can largely explain what the Court is doing
and why. But the rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns identified
above will persist until the Court actually adopts this explanation
in a majority opinion. If the need to police resistance is the basis on
which error-correcting summary reversals are justified, that
principle should be explicitly adopted so that it can constrain
decision-making going forward.
Explicit adoption would also encourage more open debate over the
Court’s chosen criteria as well as permit scrutiny of whether the
Court is properly following them. In particular, future research may
help to uncover whether lower courts are in fact erring more
systematically in federal habeas and qualified immunity cases, and
thus provide a basis to critique or reaffirm the Court’s current focus.
Likewise, future certiorari petitioners would have an incentive to
search for evidence of systematic error in the lower courts to encourage the Court to summarily reverse a fact-bound case. As one
possibility, Baude cites research suggesting that lower courts have
systematically erred in their application of the Speedy Trial Act.126
To the extent the Court is presented with such petitions and
accompanying research in the future, its willingness to apply the
stated principle faithfully would go a long way toward addressing
the rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns. But the key point for
present purposes is that the Court must articulate this or some
other principle to begin moving in the right direction.
Setting aside the rule-of-law and legitimacy concerns, whether
the Court’s method of rebuking lower courts is likely to be effective
in achieving the Court’s apparent ends is a separate question. I turn
to that issue in the next Section.

125. Id.
126. See Baude, supra note 1, at 39 (citing Shon Hopwood, The Not So Speedy Trial Act, 89
WASH. L. REV. 709, 744-45 (2014)).
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B. The Limits of Rebuke
The language in the Court’s summary reversals in habeas and
qualified immunity cases reflects apparent frustration that the
message the Court has been trying to send has not gotten through.
This Section questions whether continuing efforts to rebuke lower
courts are likely to promote the harmonization the Court seeks.
The Court’s goal in these cases is to ensure that lower courts are
consistently applying the articulated legal standards with appropriate deference to other decision makers.127 The challenge facing the
Court is that these standards require the exercise of case-by-case
discretion, and in the absence of Supreme Court precedent that is
directly on point, lower-court judges have flexibility to reach results
that differ from what the Court itself might have decided.128
The question is whether fear of summary reversal is likely to
change the behavior of judges, and the answer is more complicated
than it might initially appear. Consider first what the lower-court
judge’s role is supposed to entail. There is no doubt that lower-court
judges are obligated to follow squarely applicable Supreme Court
precedent. The more controversial and unsettled question is
whether they are obligated to anticipate the direction in which the
Court is headed, or whether they should instead continue to apply
their own best understanding of the law.129 For example, if the Court
has read Fourth Amendment rights narrowly in several contexts,
should a lower-court judge who has a more robust vision of the
Fourth Amendment (with at least some case law and history to
support it) nonetheless follow the Court’s lead in a context it has not
previously addressed?
For those judges that believe they are obligated to apply their
own best judgment, reversal is just a part of doing business.130 Some
127. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
128. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575-76 (1987).
129. See Re, supra note 123, at 936-45 (describing different models for understanding the
scope of the Supreme Court’s authority); see also Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 390 (2007) (“While it is widely accepted that judges have a duty to follow
the precedents of a superior court, the claim that lower courts should also conform to the
policy preferences of the Supreme Court, even when not expressed in binding decisional law,
is quite distinct and open to serious question.”).
130. See Kim, supra note 129, at 402-03 (questioning whether fear of reversal is a major
factor in motivating compliance with Supreme Court precedent).
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may even embrace the idea of active resistance. The recently
deceased Judge Reinhardt, who was described as “[t]he last great
liberal lion” of the federal courts,131 famously scoffed at the idea that
reversal by the Supreme Court should be a badge of dishonor.132 He
had his own understanding of what the Constitution requires, and
although he was obligated to follow Supreme Court precedent, he
did not feel bound to anticipate the Court’s next move to the right.133
And with the fact-specific inquiries required by habeas and qualified
immunity cases, lower-court judges will often have flexibility to
distinguish Supreme Court precedent with which they disagree.134
For judges such as Reinhardt, it is difficult to imagine that the
fear of summary reversal influences the calculation. If they believe
the Supreme Court is headed in the wrong direction and they are
obligated to make their own best judgments about the law, then
reversal by the Court is simply an indication of disagreement.135 Of
course, most lower-court judges are not willing to speak as openly
as Judge Reinhardt about their resistance impulses, so it is difficult
to say how many hold similar attitudes.136 But one relevant data
point is that several judges have been summarily reversed on
multiple occasions in the same categories of cases, suggesting that
the first one or two may not have deterred them.137 And even those
who would not go so far as to embrace the idea of resistance may
131. Garrett Epps, In Prop. 8 Ruling, a Liberal Lion Coos, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/prop-8-ruling-liberal-lion-coos [https://perma.cc/S8RX-5E6J].
132. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, In Memoriam: Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 2101, 2102 (2018).
133. Andrew Crespo, a former Reinhardt clerk, describes Judge Reinhardt as being willing
to resist the direction in which Supreme Court doctrine was predictably headed, but not
willing to defy the Court once it had squarely addressed an issue. See id.
134. See Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2045, 2088 (2008) (noting the “great deal of leeway” judges have in applying such standards);
see also Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1994) (“Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that when judges
care deeply about a particular legal issue but disagree with existing precedent, they often
attempt to subvert the doctrine and free themselves from its fetters by stretching to
distinguish the holdings of the higher court.”).
135. See Kim, supra note 129, at 433; Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14-15 (1993).
136. For a discussion of lower-court resistance in other contexts, see Re, supra note 123,
at 960-66.
137. See Baude, supra note 1, at 41-47 (listing judges who have been summarily reversed
three or more times and the issues involved).
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consider themselves ethically bound to focus solely on legal
considerations and ignore the threat of personal stigma from being
summarily reversed as irrelevant.138
At the same time that summary reversals are failing to dissuade
one group of judges, a different set is likely to be overdeterred by the
threat of being summarily reversed. Notably, lower-court judges
have begun to acknowledge this threat as an explicit consideration.139 The motivating factors for such judges may vary. One group
may take the view, noted above, that lower-court judges should
anticipate the general direction of the Court’s decisions.140 Another
group may be generally in agreement with the Court’s jurisprudence
in these areas, or else hold neutral or weak views.141 Still another
group may believe that being summarily reversed harms their
reputations.142 These groups are not mutually exclusive. But for all
of them, it will be difficult not to take the path of least resistance
and deny habeas relief or grant qualified immunity at every
opportunity.
It may be that a majority of the Court believes the bar in these
cases should be so high that overdeterrence is not a serious concern.
But if five Justices believe that at least some cases warrant
granting habeas relief and denying qualified immunity, then there
is a risk that the current approach to summary reversals will skew
results too far in the other direction. Moreover, the combined effect
of some judges resisting and others being overdeterred is to
exacerbate the inconsistencies in lower-court decisions and create
an overall sense of dysfunction. The question is whether any
strategy other than rebuke is likely to be more effective.
The next Part proposes a new approach to summary dispositions
that indeed has the potential to reduce inconsistency in federal
138. See Kim, supra note 129, at 402-04 (arguing that judges are most influenced by “legal
preferences” rather than either fear of reversal or political preferences).
139. See, e.g., Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing the threat of
summary reversal as a reason to “think twice before denying qualified immunity”).
140. See Re, supra note 123, at 940-42.
141. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998)
(“Judges are more likely to obey legal doctrine when such doctrine supports the partisan or
ideological policy preferences of the court majority.”).
142. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55,
89-90 (2016) (citing evidence of the perceived reputational harm of being reversed in general).
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habeas and qualified immunity decisions, though the proposal is
designed with a broader purpose than merely improving those
particular areas of law.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
In this Part, I provide a novel normative justification for the use
of summary dispositions. It is not my goal to justify existing
practice, although some instances would indeed be proper under my
theory. My goal rather is to contend that the nature of summary
dispositions makes them well suited to a particular purpose, and
then in Part IV to suggest how practices could be reshaped to serve
that purpose most effectively.
This Part proposes that the Supreme Court use summary
dispositions as a means of developing the meaning of high-level
legal standards. Many doctrinal tests, whether imposed by statute
or developed by the Supreme Court, cannot be meaningfully
understood until they have been applied to specific facts in a series
of cases.143 But the Court does not have room on its docket to grant
plenary review of numerous cases on the same subject merely to
refine the contours of an otherwise clearly stated standard.
Summary dispositions can be useful for precisely that purpose.
The first Section below lays out the proposal in greater detail. The
second Section elaborates on the proposal’s benefits by explaining
how even short, per curiam opinions can have precedential value
and then addresses the particular value the proposal has for the
federal habeas and qualified immunity contexts. The final Section
considers the proposal’s costs.
A. A New Purpose
When Congress instructs federal courts not to grant a habeas
petition unless the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,”
that instruction is hardly self-defining.144 The same is true when the
Court bases qualified immunity on whether there has been a
143. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
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violation of “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”145
The question of reasonableness is the quintessential legal
standard. In applying a standard, as opposed to a determinate rule,
the decision maker must exercise substantial discretion to weigh all
the relevant circumstances in determining what the law requires.146
Standards are a necessary feature of any legal system because it is
impossible to prescribe rights and obligations for every conceivable
circumstance. The tradeoffs between rules and standards are well
known,147 and although there may be disagreement about whether
the system as a whole needs more of one or the other form of
directive,148 even those who tend to prefer rules agree that standards are, in some circumstances, inevitable.149 To use a common
example, determining liability for negligence requires asking the
high-level question of what a reasonably prudent person would have
done, because it is “impossible to provide specific rules to guide all
the behavior that is governed by the negligence standard.”150
The formulation of such high-level standards does not, however,
mean that no further guidance can be provided. It is a familiar
feature of common law systems that the law’s content develops over
the course of a series of cases,151 and although the Supreme Court
is not formally a common law court, it often functions like one in its

145. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
146. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992).
147. See id. at 62-69. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing the tradeoffs from an economic perspective).
148. For example, Sullivan shows how the Justices split on this question of form in the
1991 Term, most prominently Justice Scalia on the side of rules and Justice Stevens on the
side of standards. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 83-95.
149. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1182 (1989) (acknowledging the need for standards “in those matters on which law is unable,
owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact
pronouncement” (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, ch. xi, § 19, at 127 (Ernest Barker ed.
& trans., Oxford 1946))); see also id. at 1187 (“We will have totality of the circumstances tests
and balancing modes of analysis with us forever.... All I urge is that those modes of analysis
be avoided where possible.”).
150. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 81 (2016).
151. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (describing
the common law method as “inductive,” in which courts draw “generalizations from
particulars”).
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development of constitutional or federal statutory law.152 As a highlevel standard gets applied to new facts, its once vague meaning
becomes more precise.153 Each individual case becomes a precedent
to which later courts can analogize the facts before them.154 The
body of cases as a whole enables practitioners to develop a “good
working sense of the law.”155 Indeed, it may be possible for the
courts to articulate more precise, rule-like directives for particular
contexts that fall within the general standard.156
Of course, the Court can sometimes perform this function through
its plenary docket. But it cannot regularly devote time to this task
when other areas of the law—perhaps where there is no governing
legal standard or there exist conflicting approaches among the
circuits—are in more urgent need of attention. Summary dispositions allow the Court to perform this function without expending the
resources needed to review merits briefs and hold oral argument.157
Notably, the use of summary dispositions for this purpose avoids
one of the most significant objections to the practice. That is, critics
have objected most strenuously to summary reversals that resolve
complex legal questions or otherwise revise the law, primarily
because of the greater risk of error that such cases present.158 Such
risks are reduced when summary dispositions are used to define the
contours of a previously established legal standard. The risk of
creating bad law is minimal because the core principles should
already be clear and the new case merely helps fill out the larger
152. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 879 (1996).
153. Hellman makes this point, though he does so as a concession while criticizing
summary reversals, not as a way to argue that they be used for this purpose. See Hellman,
supra note 46, at 831 (“[E]ven if a case does no more than apply a well-settled rule to a
particular set of facts, the decision, together with others, will help in delineating the contours
of the rule.”).
154. See Watford, Chen & Basile, supra note 19, at 569.
155. GARNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 81.
156. See Scalia, supra note 149, at 1183; see also Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REV. 379, 415 (1985) (explaining how the reasonable person standard could be
translated into more precise rules for specific contexts such as “automobile accidents, professional services, recreational activities, and so on”).
157. In emphasizing efficiency, my proposal is consistent with Hemmer’s understanding
of summary reversals as an exercise of managerial authority. See Hemmer, supra note 73, at
210. But as noted above, I am offering a new normative justification for when this authority
should be used.
158. See Hellman, supra note 46, at 833; Note, supra note 35, at 709.
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picture. Further, under Richard Re’s model for interpreting
Supreme Court signals, summary dispositions could be treated as
less authoritative than “conventional precedent.”159 Although the
Supreme Court itself has not taken this view, it could do so and
thereby create lower stakes for each individual case. Such an
approach would give the Court a freer hand to refine its thinking in
future cases while still providing lower courts with some guidance
to draw on in the meantime.
That still leaves the risk of reaching the wrong result in the case
at hand. Dissenting Justices in summarily reversed cases have
sometimes noted that the fact-intensive nature of the issues warrants a fuller review of the record than the Court conducted.160 The
risk of errors of that sort can never be avoided entirely, and their
possibility provides a reason for the Court to exercise caution and
restraint in using this tool. I offer further thoughts on the issue of
the risk of error in Parts IV.B and IV.C below.
Related to the previous point, my proposal provides an answer to
the puzzle highlighted by Hemmer regarding how a case can be
worthy of a certiorari grant but not important enough to require
plenary review.161 The answer is that the case can be important but
not complex. The issues presented in such a case should typically be
straightforward for the reasons just discussed. This is not to say
that the cases I have in mind will be easy; they will require
thoughtful deliberation and calibrated judgment. But compared
with cases presenting thorny legal questions, cases requiring
judgment calls on the application of law to fact can be resolved
without the same level of adversarial process.
As for their importance, summary dispositions used in the way I
propose serve the valuable purpose of clarifying the contours of key
legal standards. Each individual case may be relatively insignificant
from the standpoint of developing the law, but multiple cases
elaborating the same doctrinal tests serve that function in the
159. See Re, supra note 123, at 943.
160. See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But
even if granting review qualified as a proper exercise of our discretionary authority, I would
resist summary reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The fact-intensive character of the
case calls for attentive review of the record, including a trial transcript that runs over 1,500
pages. Careful inspection of the record would be aided by the adversarial presentation that
full briefing and argument afford.”).
161. See Hemmer, supra note 73, at 221.

2020]

SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS AS PRECEDENT

723

aggregate.162 Indeed, there is no way for the Court to flesh out the
meaning of high-level standards but through elaboration in multiple
cases.
B. Benefits
In this Section, I elaborate on the benefits of the proposal, first
explaining more generally why even short, per curiam decisions
have precedential value and then exploring the particular potential
value they hold in the contexts of federal habeas and qualified
immunity.
1. The Precedential Value of Summary Dispositions Generally
Discussions of summary dispositions sometimes suggest that they
hold minimal value as precedent. For example, Gerard Magliocca
describes that value as “close to zero,” because “that’s what happens
to short opinions that are long on facts and short on analysis.”163
The suggestion that fact-bound opinions cannot effectively guide
future reasoning has intuitive appeal.164 Certainly they have less of
an impact than new pronouncements of high-level principles that
may apply to a broad range of cases. But it would be an overstatement to suggest that summary dispositions cannot contribute meaningfully to the development of the law.
A decision about how a standard applies to a given set of facts can
be immediately useful by serving as a source to which later cases
can analogize.165 This value is clearest for factually similar cases,
162. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
163. Gerard Magliocca, Summary Reversals in the Supreme Court, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(June 11, 2012), https://concurringopinions.com/ archives/2012/06/summary-reversals-in-thesupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/TKY6-EP49].
164. The Supreme Court has made the same observation in the context of explaining why
courts should sometimes skip the first step in qualified immunity analysis, whether there has
been a constitutional violation, and go straight to the second step, whether the official violated
a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (“[T]here are cases in which the constitutional question
is so factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases.”). I discuss Pearson
in the next Section.
165. See Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 768 (2003) (“Even if resolution of the new case is easy, the new decision
has precedential value because the rule has been applied to a fact variation. The general rule
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and some factual scenarios may recur so often that it will be
possible to develop useful, targeted rules for a subcategory of the
cases governed by the general standard.166 Further, that the later
case is not factually identical to the earlier one does not mean that
guidance cannot be extrapolated. To be sure, the later court has
discretion in deciding either that the similarities are sufficient to
require the same result, or that the differences warrant the opposite
conclusion.167 But the earlier court’s decision provides a valuable
starting point for the analysis.168 Cass Sunstein defends reasoning
by analogy against charges of indeterminacy, emphasizing that
some discipline is possible because analogies serve as “fixed points”
in the process.169
Nor is the possibility of analogical reasoning limited to cases that
are substantially similar on the facts. When a court confronts a case
“for which no direct precedent exists,” it does not simply start from
scratch, but rather seeks guidance in analogous cases.170 The goal in
such reasoning is to further “principled consistency,” recognizing
that the two superficially dissimilar cases share a deeper commonality that requires the law to treat them the same.171 Sunstein
suggests that analogical reasoning, as a form of “‘bottom-up’
thinking,” allows ideas to be “developed from the details, rather
than imposed ... from above.”172 I would add only that, even when a
general legal standard has already been imposed, it is through
concrete cases and analogical reasoning that the meaning of that
standard develops.
or exception has expanded, despite its verbal stability, by sweeping in the new complex of
facts.”).
166. See id. at 786 (“Over time, when case volume is large, a host of quite determinate rules
of law are generated from the same starting-point standard being applied in the same genre
of cases.”).
167. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 92; see also id. at 73 (noting that the “later court
always gets the last word”).
168. See Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1258-59 (2004).
169. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 777 (1993).
Sunstein’s elaboration of the value of analogies dovetails with my broader argument about
the need to illustrate high-level legal standards: “Without analogies, relevant principles often
cannot be described in advance except at an uninformatively high and crude level of
generality.” Id. at 775.
170. GARNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 105.
171. Sunstein, supra note 169, at 746.
172. Id.
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Furthermore, setting aside the potential for analogizing, in the
longer run, a group of fact-bound decisions can provide a broader
sense of how the standard should be calibrated, and such calibration
is useful even to courts considering factually dissimilar cases.173 In
other words, seeing a range of cases that have been judged reasonable and unreasonable provides a general sense of where the line is.
Certainly the Supreme Court’s habeas and qualified immunity
jurisprudence has demonstrated the high bar needed for a state
court’s decision or government official’s conduct to be deemed
unreasonable,174 and understanding where the bar is helps to guide
analysis even when factual analogizing is not possible. Conversely,
the lack of calibration for the plausibility pleading standard means
lower courts may diverge substantially on where to draw that
line.175
Finally, to the extent the skepticism about precedential value
concerns the shortness of summary dispositions, that objection
seems unwarranted based on the actual product the Court typically
produces. Under current practices, per curiam summary dispositions generally consist of several pages laying out the relevant
factual circumstances, the governing legal standard, and a concise
rationale.176 They do not resemble, as a point of contrast, the unpublished memorandum dispositions that some circuit courts issue,
with no factual summary and a conclusory assertion of the result.177
When the legal standard is clear and only its application is unsettled, a short opinion suffices to resolve the case and provide some
guidance to future litigants.178

173. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 150, at 105-06, 113.
174. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
177. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 360-64 (2011) (describing the extent to
which different circuits rely on unpublished dispositions). Under current rules, such
dispositions may be cited but are not treated as precedential. See id. at 361. For an example
of the most bare-bones variety, pulled randomly from a list of recent cases, see Polidur v.
Barr, No. 17-71436, 2019 WL 764424, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2019) (deciding the appeal in six
textual sentences, including one on jurisdiction and one on the standard of review).
178. See Cappalli, supra note 165, at 793 (suggesting that circuit courts dealing with
settled law should nonetheless write short opinions, rather than resorting to unpublished
dispositions).
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As evidence of the precedential value I have argued for, it may be
useful to examine how lower courts have actually used a recent
summary disposition by the Supreme Court. Consider Kisela v.
Hughes, which I have chosen because it is a recent case that drew
a dissent and is therefore likely to provide more useful guidance
than a more obvious case.179 In Kisela, three police officers responded to a 911 call about a woman acting erratically while
holding a knife.180 They found Amy Hughes with a kitchen knife and
observed her take several steps toward another woman, Sharon
Chadwick, who they would later learn was Hughes’s roommate.181
Standing on the other side of a chain-link fence, the police officers
twice ordered Hughes to drop the knife.182 When she failed to comply
or otherwise acknowledge the officers’ commands, one of the officers,
Andrew Kisela, fired four shots, striking Hughes and causing nonlife-threatening injuries.183 The Court held that Kisela was entitled
to qualified immunity, concluding that “[t]his is far from an obvious
case in which any competent officer would have known that shooting
Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate the Fourth Amendment.”184
Kisela was a fact-bound case in that its holding depended on the
particular combination of several circumstances.185 In support of its
conclusion, the Court emphasized that “Kisela had mere seconds to
assess the potential danger to Chadwick,” that Hughes had just
been observed acting erratically while holding a large knife, and
that “Hughes had moved to within a few feet of Chadwick” while
failing to acknowledge orders to drop her knife.186 But despite this
fact-intensive reasoning, the Court’s opinion is valuable in helping
lower courts make the difficult judgment about where the line is for
an officer who has used deadly force to still be entitled to qualified
immunity.
179. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam). Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice
Ginsburg. Id. at 1155 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In Part IV.C below, I explain why borderline
cases are more useful than outliers in illustrating the operation of a legal standard.
180. Id. at 1150.
181. Id. at 1151.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1153.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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The Kisela decision was handed down on April 2, 2018, and in
roughly a year and a half it has already been cited at least 517
times.187 Of course, many of these citations are for basic principles
that happened to be restated by Kisela but could just as easily have
been found in many other qualified immunity cases. Twenty-eight
of the citations are given four bars on Westlaw’s depth of treatment
scale, which means the case “examined” Kisela, while another 122
citations are given three bars, which means the court “discussed”
Kisela.188
It is not the sheer length of the Kisela discussion, which is how
Westlaw determines its depth of treatment rating,189 that matters.
Again, cases may quote at length from Kisela simply because it
provided a recent statement of the relevant principles.190 What
matters to the present discussion is how many cases were meaningfully guided by Kisela. In particular, did the lower courts engage
with the facts of Kisela to help with interpreting the facts they were
confronting? Those that did can be more fairly characterized as
having been guided by Kisela and thus having benefited from its
availability as precedent.
I reviewed the 150 decisions available as of November 10, 2019,
with three or four bars on the depth of treatment scale to see how
many of them engaged with the facts of Kisela.191 Of the twentyeight four-bar cases,192 I would characterize eleven as having done
so: four found Kisela distinguishable and denied qualified
immunity,193 while the other seven granted qualified immunity.194
187. Kisela v. Hughes Citing References, THOMSON REUTERS, https://1.next.westlaw.com
[https://perma.cc/K7KS-8ENU] [hereinafter Citing References] (login to Westlaw; search
“Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018)”; click on tab labeled “Citing References”; on left side
click on the filter titled “Cases”).
188. See Thomson Westlaw, KeyCite on Thomson Reuters Westlaw, THOMAS REUTERS 1,
3 https://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/KeyCite%20on%20Westlaw.pdf
[https://perma. cc/KQ3A-7HXA]. Four bars means an “[e]xtended discussion of the cited case
or administrative decision; usually more than a printed page of text,” while three bars means
a “[s]ubstantial discussion of the cited case or administrative decision; usually more than a
paragraph but less than a printed page.” Id.
189. See id.
190. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152-53.
191. See Citing References, supra note 187.
192. See id.
193. Kelley v. O’Malley, No. 18-3283, 2019 WL 4667544, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2019); Cole
v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2019); Gardner v. New Jersey State Police, No. 1508982, 2018 WL 5342715, at *12 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2018); Ramirez v. Fonseca, 331 F. Supp. 3d
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Not surprisingly, most of the 122 three-bar citations did not engage
with the facts of Kisela, but five did: four found Kisela distinguishable and denied qualified immunity,195 while one granted qualified
immunity.196
What insights can be gleaned from this single example? First,
that there were sixteen cases in a short period of time engaging with
the facts of Kisela is at least some evidence that lower courts find
precedential value even in fact-bound summary dispositions. Also
of note is the range of ways in which those courts relied on Kisela.
For example, because the extent of the threat is the central inquiry,197 Kisela would be most directly controlling in any case
involving a weapon-wielding victim that made threatening moves.
The closest such case of the group involved a victim who held a
“garden spade with a pointed metal head” and “advanced towards
[the defendant] in an aggressive manner.”198
In other cases, the threat was less obvious, and the court had to
make a judgment about whether the totality of the circumstances,
some of which matched and others of which differed from Kisela,
justified reaching the same result. For example, the plaintiff-victim
in one case did not wield the knife, but possessed it in his pocket.199
The court in that case relied on Kisela in granting qualified
immunity, emphasizing that the plaintiff had not only ignored the
officer’s commands but did the opposite in moving his hands toward

667, 674-77 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
194. Ventura v. Rutledge, 398 F. Supp. 3d 682, 696-97 (E.D. Cal. 2019); Lambert v. Town
of Merrimack, No. 17-cv-404-AJ, 2019 WL 1333309, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 25, 2019); Reyes v.
Galpin, No. 3:18cv831 (JBA), 2019 WL 959680, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2019); Cortesluna v.
Leon, No. 17-CV-05133-JSC, 2018 WL 6727824, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018); Woods v.
City & County of San Francisco, No. 3:15-CV-05666-WHO, 2018 WL 4896766, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 9, 2018); Kelley v. O’Malley, 328 F. Supp. 3d 447, 457 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (mem.); Brunette
v. City of Burlington, No. 2:15-cv-00061, 2018 WL 4146598, at *26-27 (D. Vt. Aug. 30, 2018).
195. Estate of Casillas v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-1042 AWI-SAB, 2019 WL 2869079,
at *27 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2019); Williams v. Goodfriend, 347 F. Supp. 3d 169, 181 (W.D.N.Y.
2018); Gibbs v. City of Bridgeport, No. 3:16-CV-635 (JAM), 2018 WL 4119588, at *11 (D.
Conn. Aug. 29, 2018); Osterhout v. Timms, No. 17-CIV-099-RAW, 2018 WL 1915931, at *5
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2018).
196. Laniado v. County of Ocean, No. 3:18-CV-1513-BRM-TJB, 2018 WL 6171820, at *8
(D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2018).
197. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam).
198. Brunette, 2018 WL 4146598, at *26.
199. See Cortesluna, 2018 WL 6727824, at *9.
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the knife.200 Similarly, the victim in a second case held a knife by his
side but did not move toward anyone in a way that could be perceived as threatening.201 The court nonetheless relied on Kisela to
grant qualified immunity to the officers because the victim, like
Hughes, “had been behaving erratically” and disobeyed an order to
drop his knife, and unlike Hughes, was believed to have stabbed
someone earlier.202
When the differences were more significant than the similarities,
the courts distinguished the facts of Kisela and reached the opposite
result. For example, the plaintiff in one such case was carrying a
box cutter and ignored police commands to drop it, but was alleged
to have been running away at the moment he was shot.203 Thus, the
court found Kisela to be distinguishable and denied the defendant’s
qualified immunity claim.204
For present purposes, what matters is not whether these cases
were rightly decided or even whether Kisela was necessary to their
analysis. The point instead is simply that having Kisela available as
precedent gave the lower courts a useful starting point. Certainly
they were better off than they would have been with only the highlevel governing principles to direct them.205 And although they
might have reached the same result guided by other case law with
less comparable facts, their discussions of Kisela helped to ground
their reasoning in a more concrete understanding of when deadly
force is warranted in this recurring scenario.206 In short, Kisela had
precedential value, and it stands to reason that the same could be
said for many similarly fact-bound summary dispositions.
2. The Potential Value for Federal Habeas and Qualified
Immunity Cases
The preceding discussion highlighted potential benefits of the
proposed approach that would apply to any area of law in which the
200. See id. at *11.
201. Woods v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 3:15-cv-05666-WHO, 2018 WL 4896766,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018).
202. Id. at *9.
203. See Ramirez v. Fonseca, 331 F. Supp. 3d 667, 675-76 (W.D. Tex. 2018).
204. See id. at 677.
205. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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Court has articulated high-level legal standards. I turn now to the
two areas in which the Court has used summary reversals most
often, federal habeas and qualified immunity. These areas share a
common feature that is worth describing in further detail. My
discussion of this feature initially reveals a limitation on my
proposal, but also highlights an opportunity for using summary
dispositions to create additional precedential value.
The common feature is that both federal habeas and qualified
immunity often present two layers of potential vagueness. The tests
for when they apply are themselves high-level standards: whether
a state court’s decision constitutes an unreasonable application of
clearly established law207 (in the case of federal habeas), and
whether an official’s conduct violates clearly established rights of
which a reasonable person would have known208 (in the case of
qualified immunity). But the embedded issue—the underlying law
or right in question—may itself require asking a vague question.
For example, many habeas claims involve Sixth Amendment
challenges to the effectiveness of counsel. The governing doctrinal
test there, under Strickland v. Washington, is whether counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”209
Likewise, many qualified immunity cases involve claims of excessive
force under the Fourth Amendment. The governing doctrinal test
there, under Graham v. Connor, is again an objective reasonableness standard.210
Since AEDPA, the Court has reviewed dozens of habeas cases as
part of its plenary and summary dockets.211 The same is true for
qualified immunity cases over the past couple of decades. 212 So the
need for more precedential guidance on the outer layer standard
alone is probably minimal. But what each new case does potentially
add is greater clarity surrounding the interaction of the two levels
of analysis. For example, when the Court decides that the lower
207. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
208. E.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam).
209. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
210. 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989).
211. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 99 (2012) (counting 115 habeas decisions after AEDPA through
2012).
212. See Baude, supra note 99, at 82 (counting thirty cases since the Court decided Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
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federal court erred in granting habeas relief on an ineffective
assistance claim, that case serves as a useful model for what it
means for the state court to unreasonably apply the Strickland
standard. Likewise, when the Court decides that the lower federal
court erred in denying qualified immunity in an excessive force case,
that decision serves as a useful model for determining when an
officer acts unreasonably under the Graham standard.
All of that said, it is useful to remember that summary dispositions in habeas and qualified immunity cases cannot by themselves
establish the full contours of the underlying legal standards. That
is because when the Court concludes that habeas relief is not
warranted or qualified immunity should be granted, it need not
decide how the embedded issue would be resolved in the absence of
the outer layer of reasonableness.213 This is the key limitation I
alluded to at the outset of this Section on the precedential value of
summary dispositions in these types of cases.
Critics of the Court’s jurisprudence in these areas often bemoan
the fact that it allows constitutional violations to go unchecked.214
AEDPA requires clearly established law to come from the Supreme
Court, and though it is unclear whether circuit precedent counts for
purposes of qualified immunity, the Court often overrides lower
courts’ interpretations of their own case law in any event.215 The
problem is that the Supreme Court does not take enough cases in
these areas to establish much clear law, leaving only the very
general standards to govern.216 That means that state courts and
government officials are able to violate the Constitution without
consequence so long as they do not unreasonably apply those vague
principles.
213. See, e.g., Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017) (per curiam) (“We express no view
on the merits of the underlying question outside of the AEDPA context.”); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct.
at 308 (“We address only the qualified immunity question, not whether there was a Fourth
Amendment violation in the first place.”).
214. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 1221-22; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing
the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (“For rights that
depend on vindication through damages actions, the repeated invocation of qualified
immunity will reduce the meaning of the Constitution to the lowest plausible conception of
its content.”).
215. See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 311-12.
216. See Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First
Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 598-600 (2009).
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With a shift in practices, the Court can take advantage of the
efficiency of summary dispositions to have an impact in these areas.
As to the criminal procedure issues that arise in habeas cases, the
Court can resolve the underlying questions by taking more cases on
direct review.217 As for qualified immunity cases, the Court always
has the option to address the underlying constitutional issue, under
the two-prong test.218 It has acknowledged the benefits of doing so,
namely that it “promotes the development of constitutional precedent.”219 But it has also noted the costs of expending “scarce judicial
resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome
of the case,” when it would be simpler to hold that the right at issue
is not clearly established.220 Moreover, the Court has previously
suggested that the fact-bound nature of a case is a reason not to
address the first prong.221 Others have noted how this suggestion
creates a catch-22 for civil rights plaintiffs, as courts are told not to
create precedent in fact-bound cases, but are also required to deny
relief for lack of factually similar precedent.222 I argued in the
previous Section that fact-bound summary dispositions have more
precedential value than might first appear. I add here only that, to
the extent the Court is convinced of that value, summary dispositions provide an efficient mechanism that enables the Court to
resolve more such fact-bound cases.223
217. For this to be possible, litigants must also seek direct review of state court decisions
rather than pursuing federal habeas petitions first and reaching the Supreme Court only via
that channel. A relatively recent study finds that direct appeals by state prisoners are “grossly
underrepresented.” See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional
Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of
State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 216 (2008).
218. Following Pearson v. Callahan, courts are no longer required to address the first
prong, “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation of a
constitutional right,” but can instead opt to proceed straight to the second prong, “whether
the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 555
U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009) (citations omitted).
219. Id. at 236.
220. Id. at 236-37.
221. See supra note 164.
222. Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1887, 1905 (2018).
223. Karen Blum makes a similar call, though directed at lower courts, for addressing the
first prong in the qualified immunity analysis even in fact-bound cases:
If cases with factual similarity in particular contexts are needed to make out
clearly established law to overcome the second prong of qualified immunity, then
courts should not shy away from decisions holding specific fact-bound conduct
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In sum, taking these suggested steps would have a twofold
impact. First, it would add clarity to general legal standards that
critics have long complained are lacking in definition.224 Second,
clarity in the underlying legal standards would in turn increase the
availability of clearly established law for habeas and qualified
immunity cases, thereby reducing the concern that constitutional
violations are going unchecked.225 In this way, the challenge posed
by the unique structure of these doctrines also creates an opportunity for increased usage of summary dispositions to provide this
additional value.
This proposal may seem unrealistic given the current composition
of the Court. The more conservative Justices who constitute a
majority of the Court may believe that state courts and government
officials are already subject to overly intrusive oversight.226 I would
reiterate here that my proposal is agnostic as to the substance of the
rights at issue and focuses solely on the need for more clarity. At
least in the qualified immunity context, it is recognized that greater
clarity should operate to the benefit of government officials as well
as potential plaintiffs.227 Still, some Justices may take the view that
clarity is undesirable because maintaining legal grey areas ensures
a greater degree of deference to the original decision makers.228
While I have no direct answer to that viewpoint, I think at least
one thing can be said for the proposal that would appeal to any
audience. By creating more clearly established law, the Court may
find that the quality of the overall system’s administration of justice
unconstitutional. At the very least, holdings rendered in fact-bound cases may
serve to shrink the “gray areas.”
Id. at 1904 (footnote omitted).
224. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
226. See Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 1250 (describing the Court’s approach in these areas
as reflecting “a strictly conservative and often extreme ideology that elevates the interests of
state courts and local officials above those” of individuals and their constitutional rights).
227. The Supreme Court acknowledged this in a case that predated the Court’s temporary
experiment with mandating the two-step order. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[I]f the policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on
qualified immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary
conduct, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both
of officials and individuals.”).
228. See Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 1231 (describing and questioning the Supreme Court’s
apparent “confidence in the ability of state courts to assess federal constitutional claims,”
resulting in “total deference”).
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improves. It is likely that lower-court judges push the envelope with
existing precedent in part because they are frustrated by the lack of
clearly established law to govern constitutional violations they see
as obvious. If the Court offered more precedent in the key areas,
those same judges might be willing to tether their decisions more
closely to the Court’s. Decisions across the system would then be
more consistent and the Court could spend less time worrying that
the lower courts were resisting its commands.
C. Costs
Having laid out the benefits of the proposal, I turn now to
potential objections about its costs. One major cost I have already
considered is the risk of error, which I argued in Part III.A is at
least reduced under my proposal, but not entirely avoidable. I
return to this question below in Parts IV.B, on the desirability of
procedural reforms, and IV.C, on the issue of selecting cases.
A second objection that I anticipate concerns whether the proposed approach to summary dispositions is a good use of the Court’s
resources. That objection could take one of several forms. Although
these objections have force, they do not negate the value of the
proposal. Instead, the specifics of the proposal can be adjusted to
take these concerns into account.
One way to put the objection would be to say that the need for
clarity is not that great. For example, Justice Scalia suggested that
some degree of variation in the lower courts is entirely appropriate.229 He made this point in the context of arguing for a general
preference for rules over standards.230 Once the Court has done as
much as it can to fashion precise rules in an area, it need not review
numerous cases applying the same standard merely to assess
whether, for example, “in this particular fact situation, pattern
3,445, the search and seizure was reasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment.231 The Court can tolerate some degree of variation in
how courts decide those issues, just as the system “tolerate[s] a fair
degree of diversity in what juries determine to be negligence.”232
229.
230.
231.
232.

Scalia, supra note 149, at 1186.
See id. at 1188.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
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My response to this potential objection is to agree that perfect
uniformity is not the end goal.233 Rather, the goal is sufficient
guidance for lower courts to understand the core of how standards
framed at a high level of generality should operate. For standards
that have been announced relatively recently, the Court may need
to weigh in more frequently. But even for more established standards with extensive case law on point, some periodic refreshing of
the law through consideration of new fact patterns would be helpful.
Justice Scalia would presumably agree, as he went on to acknowledge that the Court “should take one case now and then, perhaps,
just to establish the margins of tolerable diversity.”234 If he had
considered the possibility of using summary dispositions for this
purpose, he may even have been willing to review a little more than
“one case now and then.”235
A second version of the objection is that the Court cannot afford
the time needed to monitor the development of the law across a
broad range of legal standards. The Court may be willing to pay
closer attention to certain areas in which it perceives lower courts
to have been rebelling, but it does not have time to engage in more
systematic oversight of this sort.236 My response to this objection is
twofold. First, if the Court continues to correct some errors but is
unwilling to perform this oversight function more systematically,
such unwillingness would reinforce the critique noted earlier that
the Court’s ad hoc practices are of questionable legitimacy.237
Second, although deploying summary dispositions for the suggested
purpose may lead to their more frequent use, my proposal does not
require the Court to pay equal attention to all areas of the law. The
Court can and should take into account the importance of the legal
standard at issue in deciding whether providing more guidance is
worth the effort. Its continued prioritization of areas such as federal habeas and qualified immunity would be entirely proper, given
how often they arise in the lower courts.238
233. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-1606 (2008)
(identifying and critiquing the rationales for uniformity in the federal courts).
234. Scalia, supra note 149, at 1186.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 160 (providing an example of the detailed record review sometimes
necessary even in summary dispositions).
237. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 74-75, 81-82 and accompanying text.
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A third and final version of the objection is that, in the ordinary
course of things, lower courts are supposed to flesh out the meaning
of the law after the Court has established a new doctrinal test.239
Here, again, my response is to agree and make clear that nothing in
my proposal requires the Court to act immediately after its initial
articulation. After announcing a new test, the Court should allow
issues to percolate in the lower courts, which may experiment with
different understandings and, in the course of applying the test,
produce useful data on the full range of factual contexts that may
arise.240 Only after sufficient experience has been accumulated
should the Court weigh in again. To the extent the Court needs to
adjust or refine the doctrinal principles, the Court may need to
consider some additional cases on plenary review.241 But at a certain
point, the Court will have settled the major questions, and the
remaining work will be to flesh out how the standard operates
across a range of cases.242 This is where summary dispositions can
be put to good use.
IV. REVISING THE PRACTICE OF SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
This Part considers how the Court’s practices may be revised to
better serve the new purpose for summary dispositions proposed in
Part III. The first Section suggests that summary affirmances can
be just as valuable as summary reversals in illustrating the
meaning of legal standards, and that use of affirmances may in fact
offer a number of advantages. The second Section supports adopting
other commentators’ proposed procedural reform: permitting supplemental briefs when the Court is considering summary action.

239. See, e.g., Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority for prematurely
offering “operational” guidance because “the crucible of adversarial testing on which we
usually depend, along with the experience of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and
circuit benches, could yield insights (or reveal pitfalls) we cannot muster guided only by our
own lights”).
240. See Watford, Chen & Basile, supra note 19, at 577, 579.
241. See, e.g., supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal refined the plausible pleading doctrine first announced in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly).
242. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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The third Section proposes new criteria the Court should use in
selecting cases for summary treatment. As noted above, the new
justification proposed in the previous Part is not intended to match
existing practice. There are examples of cases in which the Court
appeared to be trying to calibrate the meaning of legal standards,
and I explore some of them below. But on the whole, the best explanation of existing practice is the one commentators identified—
that the Court is attempting to rebuke lower courts for resisting its
commands.243 The proposed criteria better align the case selection
process with the new suggested purpose.
The fourth Section argues that, in the areas in which the Court
decides to intervene, it should take a more balanced approach,
replacing the one-sidedness that currently characterizes its habeas
and qualified immunity summary reversals. The fifth and final
Section discusses practical questions about how my proposal could
be implemented, including barriers based on the Court’s current
ideological composition.
A. Summary Affirmances
Summary affirmances were more commonly used during the era
in which the Supreme Court’s mandatory docket was larger.244 It
makes sense that when the Court was obligated to consider a case
but had no quarrel with the lower court’s reasoning, a simple
statement of affirmance was sufficient. As for the Court’s discretionary docket, the last time the Court summarily affirmed a case after
granting certiorari was 1979.245 Again, it makes sense that would be
rare, since granting certiorari means the case is important in some
respect and thus would typically warrant full procedures and a
thorough opinion.246 Although exceptions to that rule have been
made for summary reversals, the apparent justification—that the
lower court needs to be rebuked—would of course not apply to cases
that were correctly decided below.
If the purpose of summary dispositions is to illustrate the
meaning of legal standards, however, an affirmance can serve that
243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra Part II.A.
See Hellman, supra note 46, at 812-13.
See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 593 n.10.
See SUP. CT. R. 10.
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goal as effectively as a reversal. The Court’s task is to model the
appropriate use of the standard in question and add content to flesh
out its meaning. It can perform those functions whether it agrees or
disagrees with the lower court’s reasoning.
Further, the use of summary affirmances may afford a number of
advantages. For one thing, summary affirmances will typically be
easier to write, as the Court can track the lower court’s reasoning.247
Another advantage is that both the likelihood of error and fairness
concerns may be reduced. The likelihood of error is reduced because,
if the Court agrees with the lower court, that generally means a
larger number of judges will have endorsed the same conclusion
than in the case of a summary reversal.248 At the same time, any
concern about fairness to the litigants with the truncated process is
minimal because the actual result for them is no different than if
the certiorari petition had just been denied. Finally, by not limiting
itself to summary reversals, the Court will have more options for
useful cases to serve the goal of illustration than if it had to find
lower-court cases that were wrong.
It is difficult to say how the behavior of litigants might change if
the possibility of summary affirmance were on the table. Repeat
players such as state governments might refrain from filing
certiorari petitions in borderline cases for fear of setting unfavorable
Supreme Court precedent.249 Then the Court would have to select
more of its cases for summary treatment—reversal or affirmance—
just from the pool of petitions filed by civil rights plaintiffs or
habeas petitioners. But that concern is speculative, and the point for
now is that summary affirmances offer a useful option for the Court
to consider if it sees value in the approach proposed here.

247. See, e.g., Fausner v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973) (per
curiam) (referencing the lower court’s reasoning in a short summary affirmance).
248. This is only generally rather than always true, because the actual vote count for
summary dispositions may vary. A nine-to-zero summary reversal could have more judges
reaching the same conclusion than a five-to-four summary affirmance.
249. See Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the
Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 479-82 (2009) (describing how the
government, as a repeat player, may behave more strategically in deciding when to appeal
cases and to petition for certiorari).
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B. Procedural Reforms
As noted earlier, critics of the use of summary dispositions have
long been suggesting a simple procedural reform: that the Court
invite supplemental briefing before handing down its opinion.250
Such a measure guards against the risk of error from a truncated
procedure and reduces concerns about fairness to the litigants, since
they at least have an opportunity to weigh in before receiving a
decision.251 Furthermore, if assured of having this opportunity,
litigants would no longer need to provide the lengthy discussion of
the merits of their cases that they currently feel obligated to include
in the certiorari papers.252
The benefits of this simple step seem clear, and the costs of a
little extra time to receive and review supplemental briefing seem
minimal. The natural next question, though, is that once you allow
for supplemental briefing, why not just grant oral argument as well?
After all, holding oral argument is just another hour of the Court’s
time.253 Put another way, is there any efficiency still to be gained
from a summary approach? Certainly time is saved in writing only
a short, per curiam opinion, but nothing is stopping the Court from
writing such short opinions even for cases that have been argued.254
The efficiency question is particularly important for my proposal
because it contemplates a likely increase in the Court’s summary
disposition usage.
Even with the extra step of supplemental briefing, there is
efficiency to be gained by the use of summary procedures. First, the
costs associated with oral argument are not just the hour for the
argument itself, but all the time spent preparing for it.255 Even in a
case that seems relatively clear and for which oral argument is
250. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part I.A.
252. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
253. See SUP. CT. R. 28 (“Unless the Court directs otherwise, each side is allowed one-half
hour for argument.”).
254. See generally SUP. CT. R. 1-48 (containing no length requirements for opinions).
255. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1
[https://perma.cc/JGZ9-65JQ] (“The Justices tend to view oral arguments not as a forum for
the lawyers to rehash the merits of the case … but for answering any questions that the
Justices may have developed while reading their briefs.”).
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unlikely to make a difference,256 it seems likely that the Justices
would want to come prepared with thoughtful questions and a
thorough knowledge of the record.257 In a summary proceeding, the
Court should still perform the necessary vetting of the case, but
need do so only a single time while reviewing the proposed disposition.
Second, it is important to note that inviting supplemental briefing
does not commit the Court to granting certiorari. The Court could,
after receiving the briefs, determine that the case is more complex
than it initially believed and decide not to follow through with
producing an opinion.258 By contrast, the only mechanism for ordering oral argument under the current rules is granting certiorari,259
and regardless of the existing rules it would not make sense to
require the parties to appear for argument when certiorari was still
uncertain. Further, although nothing prevents the Court from
dismissing a case even after having granted certiorari, presumably
a concern about wasted effort would make that a rare occurrence.260
Thus, a system in which the Court invites supplemental briefing for
potential summary dispositions would still be substantially more
efficient than one that simply merged all such cases onto the
plenary docket.
Given the above considerations, I would endorse the longstanding
proposal for the Court to allow supplemental briefing before issuing
a summary disposition. A separate, harder question is whether I
256. Anecdotal views on whether oral argument matters are mixed. See Warren D.
Wolfson, Oral Argument: Does It Matter?, 35 IND. L. REV. 451, 452 (2002). The question is
difficult to study empirically, though at least one study suggests that oral argument quality
influences the Justices’ votes. See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before the
Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 495-502
(2007). Regardless of the value of oral argument generally, the point here is that oral
argument is especially unlikely to make a difference in a case that the Justices were
considering handling summarily. See id.
257. See Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 255 (“[L]awyers for each party have a half
hour to make their best legal case to the Justices. Most of this time, however, is spent
answering the Justices’ questions.”).
258. See SUP. CT. R. 15 (“Any party may file a supplemental brief at any time while a
petition for a writ of certiorari is pending.” (emphasis added)); SUP. CT. R. 16 (“After
considering the documents distributed under Rule 15, the Court will enter an appropriate
order” for “disposition of a petition for” a writ of certiorari. (emphasis added)).
259. SUP. CT. R. 16.
260. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Bar, 502 U.S. 104, 104 (1991) (per curiam) (dismissing the
case, without further explanation, by stating that certiorari was “improvidently granted”).
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would condition my proposal on the Court’s adoption of this
procedural reform. My tentative view is that I would not. As I
elaborate in the next Section, I believe it is possible that some cases
taken up solely for the purpose of illustrating a previously articulated legal standard may be straightforward enough that the Court
can resolve them on the certiorari papers alone. Further, the Court
can and should factor in the complexity of a case in deciding
whether to use summary procedures.261
I describe my view as tentative because I could be persuaded
otherwise based on further experience with and information about
the Court’s summary disposition practices. And in any event, I hope
this Section convinces those who are otherwise sympathetic to my
proposal, but are primarily concerned about the risk of error, that
a system that permits supplemental briefing could strike the right
balance—reducing the risk of error while still adding enough
efficiency to justify maintaining a separate summary docket.
C. Selecting Cases for Summary Disposition
Selecting cases for summary disposition to fulfill the purpose
proposed here breaks down into three questions: first, whether the
area of law merits more precedential guidance from the Court;
second, whether the case at hand would be useful for providing such
guidance; and third, whether the use of summary procedure is
appropriate. Some of these points have been mentioned already, but
I develop them in a more detailed and structured form here.
The first question of whether the Court’s attention is warranted
turns on the need for further clarity in the area of law. Of course,
any legal standard by definition has some degree of vagueness, so
there is always value in offering up at least a couple of illustrative
cases.262 But in deciding how much oversight to provide, the Court
should take into account whether there is substantial divergence in
how the lower courts are applying the standard in question. Once
the Court has laid down adequate guideposts, further efforts may
bring diminishing returns, but continued monitoring is still
261. See infra Part IV.C.
262. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 25, at 840-42, 844-46 (discussing the
confusion surrounding the Court’s announcement of a new pleading standard, and the need
for further clarification).
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valuable, as the factual circumstances governed by the particular
standard may evolve.263
An additional factor in assessing the need for the Court’s
attention is how important the issue is. As acknowledged earlier,
the Court cannot realistically monitor the development of every
legal standard with the same degree of care, so prioritization is
inevitable.264 The Court should consider importance in terms of
what rights are at stake as well as how frequently the matter arises.
From both of those standpoints, it is entirely appropriate for habeas
and qualified immunity cases to receive frequent attention. Both
involve the protection of fundamental constitutional rights, and both
make up a substantial portion of the federal docket.265
A final factor for the threshold question is whether the issue is
ripe for the Court’s further consideration. After a standard is
initially articulated, it is entirely appropriate for the Court to allow
the lower courts to apply it in the first instance. During this time,
the lower courts have the opportunity to confront a variety of cases
featuring different factual contexts, to experiment with different
understandings of the standard’s meaning, and to uncover problems
with the Court’s formulation. When the Court intervenes again after
a period of ripening, it will have the benefit of a perspective
informed by the lower courts’ experiences.266
263. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483-84 (2014) (citing Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)) (explaining that Chimel “laid the groundwork for
most of the existing search incident to arrest doctrine,” but that this “case[ ] require[s] us to
decide how the … doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are ... based on technology
nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel … [was] decided”).
264. See supra Part III.C.
265. See supra Part I.B.
266. This is sometimes described as “percolation,” and some commentators have questioned
whether percolation is as useful as advertised. See David Hausman & Spencer E. Amdur,
Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 52-53, 53 nn.26-27
(2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/vol131_Amdur_
Hausman.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FM6-TQEQ]. There is reason to be uncertain about the value
of percolation in the sense of having lower courts articulate competing viewpoints. See id. But
the value of having more insight into the range of factual contexts to be governed by the
standard in question seems difficult to deny. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following LowerCourt Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 875 (2014) (describing a more “modest” version of the
percolation argument based on the value of seeing a rule “applied many times in many
distinct factual contexts”); cf. Richard C. Chen, Precedent and Dialogue in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 80 (2019) (making a similar point in the context of
investment treaty arbitral precedent).
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Once it is determined that the area of law warrants the Court’s
attention, the next question is whether the case at hand is well
suited for providing useful precedential guidance. Perhaps counterintuitively, the suggestion on this point is that the Court should
take more borderline cases rather than ones involving egregious
errors. Of course, if egregious errors are so common as to suggest
confusion among the lower courts, the Court should step in to
clarify, but rare outliers, no matter how extreme, should typically
not be taken up, since the goal is not to correct the errors of
individual cases.267
The Court’s current practice assumes that correcting clear errors
is precisely what summary reversals are for.268 That approach
makes sense when the goal is to rebuke egregious decisions, but not
when the goal is to provide more broadly useful precedential
guidance. Consider a spectrum of cases ranging from clearly
reasonable on one end to clearly unreasonable on the other. To use
qualified immunity as the example, if the government official’s
conduct is so clearly reasonable that most courts would have
granted immunity, there is little precedential value in summarily
reversing the case to make that point. By contrast, summarily
affirming or reversing a case that presents a close call provides
guidance to lower courts on where to draw the line in future cases.
Finally, having decided that a given case can provide useful
guidance, the Court must determine whether summary procedure
is appropriate. Two main factors bear on this question. The first
follows directly from the basic proposal I laid out in the prior Part:
the Court should decide a case summarily only when it is illustrating the operation of the standard in question, rather than seeking
to adjust or refine it.269 For the latter purposes, plenary review is
appropriate so that the Court can give fuller consideration to and a
more robust explanation of the issues. To go back to the example
used in the Introduction, Iqbal was properly decided on plenary
review because it further refined the principles first articulated in
Twombly.270 But future cases that merely illustrate the operation of
267. See supra Part III (stating that the goal is to establish “the meaning of high-level legal
standards”).
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See supra Part III.A.
270. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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the plausibility standard may properly be decided by summary
disposition.271
The line between illustration and adjustment or refinement is
admittedly blurry; even cases that merely illustrate an existing
standard are making new law.272 The key to the distinction I am
drawing is how generally applicable that new law is. When a
decision revises the terms of a given standard, that of course affects
the full range of cases to which the standard applies, and plenary
review is therefore appropriate. The same is true when a case does
not alter the standard’s express terms, but applies it in a way that
clarifies those terms for the benefit of all or many future cases.273 A
closer call would be when a decision is fact-intensive but produces
a holding that affects a subcategory of future cases.274 Depending on
the importance and size of that subcategory, plenary review may
still be warranted.
The use of summary procedures is most clearly appropriate for
cases that are so fact bound that any principle that can be derived
from them is quite narrow. As discussed in Part III.B.1, the primary
value of such cases is to provide sources for factual analogizing by
future courts. In combination with other fact-bound summary
dispositions, such illustrations help to flesh out and calibrate the
meaning of the otherwise abstract standard in question.275
A second factor to examine in deciding whether summary
procedure is appropriate is the complexity of the record. This is
intended to address the legitimate concern of mistake,276 and when
the risk is serious, the Court can either grant plenary review or
simply deny certiorari. That said, the risk of mistake should not be
overstated.277 Many cases—particularly in habeas—will have
271. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
272. This point follows from my own argument earlier that every application of law to fact
creates some precedential value. See supra Part III.B.1.
273. See Hellman, supra note 46, at 831.
274. A good example of this would be Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). There the Court
conducted a fact-intensive analysis under the general excessive force standard, but concluded
with a general principle for the subcategory of cases involving high-speed car chases. See id.
at 383-85, 386.
275. See supra Part III.B.1.
276. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
277. As noted earlier, the risk of mistake concerning the legal issues is reduced by the fact
that the Court would be limiting its use of summary dispositions to cases in which the
principles are established. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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lengthy records, but not every issue requires an equally deep factual
inquiry. When the relevant issue requires only the exercise of
judgment about a relatively clear set of facts, the Court need not
refrain from summary resolution merely because the full record is
long and complex.
A final example will help to illustrate both of the factors just
identified. Porter v. McCollum was a rare case in which the Court
not only summarily reversed in favor of a habeas petitioner, but
held that he was entitled to relief.278 The Court granted relief based
on the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.279
Regarding the attorney’s performance, the Court emphasized that
he “did not even take the first step of interviewing witnesses or
requesting records,” and “he ignored pertinent avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware.”280 As for prejudice, the
Court held that the state court had unreasonably concluded that the
defendant had failed to establish a sufficient probability of a
different result “to undermine confidence in [the] outcome.”281
Beginning with the illustration versus adjustment distinction,
Porter was a truly fact-bound case that did not substantially affect
the general doctrine.282 Instead, it illustrated in the circumstances
of a concrete case what deficient performance looks like.283 The lines
quoted above about counsel’s failure to interview witnesses and
pursue avenues for investigation may serve as useful guideposts for
future courts, but their applicability depends on whether the factual
circumstances of a future case are analogous.284 Likewise, the
Court’s prejudice analysis did not establish any generally applicable
principles, but merely illustrated how significant the undiscovered
information must be to sustain a Strickland claim over a state
court’s contrary conclusion.285 The Court’s reasoning was closely
278. 558 U.S. 30, 42-44 (2009) (per curiam). As summarized earlier, most of the summary
reversals that were decided for the habeas petitioner merely corrected procedural errors in
the lower court’s decisions. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
279. Porter, 558 U.S. at 44.
280. Id. at 39-40. Because the state court did not analyze this prong and based its
conclusion solely on prejudice, the Court did not have to defer to the state court’s reasoning
as AEDPA would otherwise have required. See id. at 37-39.
281. Id. at 44 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984)).
282. See id. at 39.
283. Id. at 41.
284. Id. at 39-40.
285. Id. at 43-44.
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tailored to this defendant’s specific crime and four mitigating factors
described in detail.286
Turning to the issue of complexity, a death penalty record is
always lengthy, and an ineffective assistance claim may often be
factually complex. But Porter shows how a claim could be resolved
summarily despite such concerns.287 The key point is that when the
facts are relatively clear, the Court’s main task is to judge their
significance, and that is not something for which more detailed
attention to the underlying record will add value.288 On counsel’s
deficiency, the Court needed only to weigh his complete lack of
investigation against the proffered explanation—that the petitioner
had been “fatalistic [and] uncooperative”—to determine that
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable.289 That basic
weighing would not have benefited from a closer review of the
record. Even the prejudice prong of the Strickland test,290 at least in
this case, could be analyzed without a comprehensive record review.
The Court needed only a basic picture of the various “aggravating
and mitigating circumstances” to be able to assess whether there
was a reasonable probability that the new evidence would have led
to a different sentence.291
In short, this was not a case in which the Court needed to
examine the underlying evidence for itself to assess conflicting
testimony or competing inferences at a micro level. A Strickland
case involving, for example, disputed assertions about what the
attorney reasonably should have found might be harder to resolve
through a summary procedure. Likewise, the dissent in Cavazos v.
Smith made a compelling objection that summary resolution was
improper for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in which each key
piece of evidence needed close inspection.292 In such a case the Court
286. See id. at 41-42. As to the mitigating circumstances, the Court cited: “(1) Porter’s
heroic military service in two of the most critical—and horrific—battles of the Korean War,
(2) his struggles to regain normality upon his return from war, (3) his childhood history of
physical abuse, and (4) his brain abnormality, difficulty reading and writing, and limited
schooling.” Id. at 41. A future court applying Porter could not extrapolate a general rule from
this reasoning, but would have to analogize a new set of facts to these.
287. See id. at 40.
288. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
289. Porter, 558 U.S. at 40.
290. See id. at 38.
291. Id. at 40.
292. See 565 U.S. 1, 9, 16-17 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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should be cautious about using summary dispositions because the
truncated process increases the risk of error. But when the analysis
requires only an exercise of judgment about the implications of a
fairly clear set of facts, summary procedure is appropriate.293
To conclude this Section, I would not claim that the foregoing
criteria can be mechanically applied to generate determinate
results. They reflect, after all, a standards-driven inquiry. But I do
contend that they would represent an improvement on the status
quo of ad hoc usage. Any expressly adopted criteria would help in
providing for a more disciplined and transparent analysis, and the
particular criteria proposed here, by advancing the normatively
attractive purpose described in the prior Part, offer a principled
path forward.
D. A More Balanced Approach
The preceding Section offered criteria for how the Supreme Court
should select cases for summary disposition with the end goal of
providing useful precedential guidance. I argue in this Section that,
within a particular area that the Court has decided needs more
clarity, it should take a balanced approach. That means taking
cases that illustrate both boundaries—granting and denying habeas
relief, granting and denying qualified immunity, and so on. Balance
does not necessarily mean precisely equal numbers, but some
attention to both sides is important.
The Court’s current practice is lopsided. In the two areas in which
it uses summary reversals most frequently, the Court has reversed
many more habeas cases in which the state lost below and many
more qualified immunity cases in which the government official lost
below than vice versa.294 Such an approach makes sense if the goal
is to quell a rebellion in which the lower courts are systematically
erring in one direction. But for the more constructive program
proposed here, summary dispositions should aim to provide guidance on the full contours of the standard in question.295
293. As noted in the preceding Section, if the procedural reform of inviting supplemental
briefs were adopted, that would provide a further safeguard against error. See supra Part
IV.B.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
295. See supra Part III.A.
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At first glance, it might seem that a lopsided approach is entirely
appropriate even if the purpose is to provide guidance rather than
to rebuke noncompliance. Assuming the Court has concluded that
the lower courts are systematically erring in one direction, it may
believe that focusing on improper habeas grants and qualified
immunity denials will help reinforce the line of separation. It is true
that having plentiful models of such cases to draw on will help lower
courts rule correctly when they confront analogous cases.296 The
problem, though, is that when lower courts encounter a case that
resembles a certain precedent but also has factual distinctions, they
lack guidance on whether those distinctive facts suffice to move the
case to the other side of the line.297 If, however, the Court actually
provided some examples of when habeas should be granted or
qualified immunity denied, the lower courts could more effectively
interpret those distinctive facts by comparing them to these models.298 In short, the line of separation becomes discernible only when
there are illustrations on both sides of it.
As Baude explains, because the Court has focused almost
exclusively on demonstrating when qualified immunity should have
been granted, lower courts lack a “roadmap to the denial of immunity.”299 While this may lead lower courts to grant immunity that
should have been denied, it could just as well lead them to deny
immunity that should have been granted. The same could be said of
habeas. The lack of a roadmap does not mean courts will not try to
find appropriate cases in which to deny immunity or grant habeas;
it just means they will have no models from the Court to guide
them.
Apart from advancing my proposed purpose, a more balanced
approach may also help to promote the broader harmonization that
the Court has sought to achieve by rebuking lower-court resistance.
As described in Part II.B, the effect of the current approach is likely
to be dysfunction, as some judges are overdeterred by the threat of
summary reversal while others actively resist the Court’s precedents.300 With a more balanced approach, judges who previously
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See Baude, supra note 1, at 14.
See id.
See Baude, supra note 99, at 83.
See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
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feared summary reversal could make their best judgments about
cases rather than skewing their decisions based on that fear. As for
judges who were unconcerned about summary reversals and held
their own strong views about the law, the impulse to resist may
similarly be weakened.301 Even if the Court has not altered the
substance of the doctrines more to the liking of such judges, they
may be willing to tether their decisions more closely to the Court’s
once it actually lays down markers on the currently neglected
side.302
Although any predictions about how lower courts would respond
to this altered approach are necessarily speculative, it is at least
possible that the overall quality of decision-making in habeas and
qualified immunity cases would improve. As with a point made
earlier concerning the need for more decisions shaping the scope of
constitutional rights,303 I offer this as a reason even the currently
conservative Court members could find value in a balanced approach.
As noted at the outset of this Section, more balance does not have
to mean perfect symmetry. It may be true that lower courts at
present are erring more often on the sides of granting habeas and
denying qualified immunity.304 If that is correct, recall that the
301. Cf. Bruhl, supra note 266, at 883 (arguing in a different context that “some degree of
lower-court buy-in” helps to increase “judicial compliance”).
302. Robert Yablon makes a similar argument for balance in habeas and criminal
procedure cases, but on different grounds and not specifically in regard to summary reversals.
He writes:
Over time, such guidance might help to curb instances in which legal
institutions and legal professionals fall short of expectations and might boost
public confidence in the legal process as well as the Court’s own institutional
standing. If the Court too often allows structural flaws and individual
malfeasance to go uncorrected, such problems may fester and multiply,
undermining the public’s faith in the Court and in the justice system as a whole.
Yablon, supra note 107, at 563 (footnotes omitted).
303. See supra Part III.B.2.
304. Baude expresses the intuition that the frequency of error may actually be comparable
in these areas:
Ultimately this is an empirical question, but I think mistaken grants of
summary judgment are probably at least as common as mistaken grants of
habeas. If the court is going to spend time reviewing individual habeas cases to
ensure that the Ninth Circuit is following the habeas statute, it seems
reasonable for it to also spend time reviewing individual civil rights cases to
ensure that other circuits are following the summary judgment standard.
Baude, supra note 16.
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Court does not have to find a case to reverse, but has the option to
use a summary affirmance to illustrate a proper habeas grant and
qualified immunity denial. Moreover, for evidence that there are in
fact cases that could have been summarily reversed in the other
direction, looking at dissents from the denial of certiorari may be a
helpful place to start.305 Justice Sotomayor in particular has used
such dissents to call attention to problematic cases in these areas.306
Although she did not get the needed votes, that may have been
because the other Justices saw the cases as fact bound, and not
because they believed the cases were correctly decided. Shifting to
a perspective in which summary dispositions are used to add
precedential guidance may have led some of them to vote differently.
E. Implementation and Ideology
The clearest way to implement the proposed approach would be
an amendment to the Supreme Court Rules articulating when
summary dispositions may be used. Short of that, endorsement of
the proposed criteria in a majority opinion would also provide
valuable constraint on future practice. Following either course, the
Court would retain significant discretion on when it uses the tool,
just as it retains wide discretion on whether to grant certiorari.307
That is by design, because the Court needs flexibility in determining
where to allocate its resources in developing the law. But even if it
is not possible to predict individual cases where the Court will
intervene by summary disposition, the value of establishing criteria
is that, when the Court does opt to do so, the choice will not seem ad
hoc but have a basis in principle, and the Court’s practices overall
will have a degree of coherence.308
In terms of potential barriers, the proposal made in this Article
is ideologically neutral, since the central goal is to increase clarity
in the application of legal standards regardless of their content. But
it is true that implementing the proposal could result in changes in
305. See Yablon, supra note 107, at 552.
306. For a summary of Justice Sotomayor’s dissents from the denial of certiorari, see id.
at 555-60.
307. SUP. CT. R. 10.
308. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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the specific areas of habeas and qualified immunity that liberals are
more likely to favor.309 Given the Court’s current composition, I have
tried to highlight at various points why the proposal could have
appeal even to conservative Justices.310 Still, the immediate prospects for the proposal may seem dim.
It should not be overlooked, however, that the liberal Justices
could play a significant role in expediting any potential reforms,
whether the one I have proposed or any other. What I described in
Part II.A as the Court’s veiled substantive agenda is possible only
because some or all of the liberal Justices join most of the per
curiam opinions.311 When summary reversals are unanimous or
nearly so, that reinforces the idea that rebuke is appropriate.312 If
the decisions instead came down on a five-to-four vote, any such
message would be substantially diluted. The implication would be
simple disagreement about the law, perhaps driven by the Court’s
ideology, rather than willful or egregious error by the lower court.313
Any threat of stigma314 would in turn be removed, freeing lowercourt judges to make their best judgments about cases.
When the liberal Justices join a summary reversal, it is safe to
assume they agree on the merits of that particular case.315 They may
also have concerns from an institutional standpoint about lowercourt judges disregarding Supreme Court precedent.316 What we do
309. See supra note 226.
310. In particular, see supra Parts III.B.2 and IV.D.
311. Out of the thirty-four habeas cases reversed in favor of the state, only the following
five came with any dissent: Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2561 (2018) (registering
a dissent by Justice Breyer without an opinion); Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603, 1606
(2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S.
520, 526 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan); Cavazos v.
Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 8 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Ginsburg). Out of the nine qualified immunity cases reversed in favor of the government
official, the following two came with a dissent: Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg); and Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
313 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
312. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 142.
315. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
316. Of course, they may take this view regardless of whether they agree with the
precedent being applied. In other words, they might as an original manner have taken a
different approach in developing habeas and qualified immunity jurisprudence, as well as the
underlying constitutional rights, but still feel obligated to enforce the Court’s mandate on
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not know is how many cases they would reverse in the other
direction if the liberal bloc held a majority. As noted in the prior
Section, Justice Sotomayor, sometimes joined by Justice Ginsburg,
has flagged some such cases in dissents from the denial of
certiorari,317 and in one instance the two Justices specifically called
out the Court’s lopsided use of summary reversals in the qualified
immunity context.318 We do not know whether Justices Breyer and
Kagan are similarly troubled by the pattern, but Justice Kagan at
least has joined two dissents from the denial of certiorari in habeas
cases that called for summarily reversing against the state.319
In any event, my suggestion is that, to the extent the four liberal
Justices agree that some summary dispositions going against the
state or government official are warranted, they can do more than
dissent from the denial of certiorari in those cases. They should
instead decline to join any summary reversals in the opposite
direction until their conservative counterparts show an interest in
greater balance.320 Adopting this stance would significantly weaken
the Court’s efforts to police through rebuke because the vote in
future such cases would be close and along ideological lines.
Moreover, the conservative majority would have to weigh the
benefits of error correction against the costs of exacerbating

apparently resisting lower courts. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part IV.D. It is entirely possible that more such cases exist, but were not
worth flagging given the lack of votes on their side.
318. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282-83 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
319. See Lance v. Sellers, 139 S. Ct. 511, 511-12 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan); Jordan v. Fisher, 135 S. Ct.
2647, 2648 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan).
320. Admittedly, this sort of strategic posturing is not something that fits comfortably
within the judicial role. For example, the Justices have not historically engaged in vote
trading the way legislators do. See Adam Liptak, No Vote-Trading Here, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/weekinreview/16liptak.html [https://perma.cc/
XW2H-MSDP]. Apparently even that is not entirely off-limits, as a recent report describes
how the Justices negotiated a compromise in the 2012 Affordable Care Act case. See Joan
Biskupic, The Inside Story of How John Roberts Negotiated to Save Obamacare, CNN POL.
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/politics/john-roberts-obamacare-the-chief/
index.html [https://perma.cc/NW5P-6FLQ]. In any event, the suggestion here should be less
controversial because the liberal Justices would be attempting to force more principled
decision-making rather than extracting a return favor.
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concerns about politicized decision-making.321 The possibility of a
new approach would then be ripe for consideration.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s use of summary dispositions encountered skepticism
almost from the time it began. The major question surrounding
them today is when they can be properly used. Although commentators have been able to identify the Court’s tendencies, the Court’s
failure to adopt any governing criteria raises rule-of-law and
legitimacy concerns. Further, if its goal is to rebuke lower courts to
enforce better compliance with its decisions, there are reasons to
doubt such an approach is likely to be effective.
This Article suggests a different justification by showing how
summary dispositions are an ideal mechanism for developing
precedential guidance about the meaning of high-level legal
standards. And it derives principled criteria from that novel
justification to help the Court select the right cases for summary
disposition. The perhaps unexpected conclusion is that summary
dispositions are not just unfortunate phenomena that need to be
accounted for. Rather, they stand to play a valuable and constructive role in the development of the law.

321. Chief Justice Roberts has long been described as sensitive about public perceptions
of the Court, and that sensitivity has only increased in light of recent events, including Justice
Kennedy’s retirement, the contentious confirmation hearings for Justice Kavanaugh, and
attacks by President Trump on the federal judiciary. See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends
Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks “Obama Judge,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html
[https://perma.cc/U3UC-ZCRF].

